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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 
by 
Wenjun Xue 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Hakan Yilmazkuday, Major Professor 
My dissertation investigates financial sector development, economic growth and 
stability through the analysis of Chinese and international evidence. My first chapter is 
the introduction. The second chapter investigates the effects of Chinese financial and 
fiscal policies on the Chinese economic recovery in the 2008 economic stimulus Plan, 
covering the period from the Great Recession to 2014. This chapter explores the effects 
of the increase in bank credit growth with significant strain of banking health on 
firm-level output, employment and investment. The results demonstrate that the increase 
in government expenditure due to the fiscal policies has the significant effects on the very 
same firm-level indicators. The effects of such policies are shown to depend on firm 
characteristics such as size, liability ratio, profitability, ownership and industry. 
Regarding the dynamic effects of the policies, it is documented that the roles of Chinese 
financial and fiscal policies are effective but temporary on the Chinese economic 
recovery within about 2 years. 
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In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of financial sector development on the 
growth volatility by using the data of 50 countries. The empirical results show that the 
aggregate growth volatility declines from 1997 to 2014 in the global perspective while 
the advanced countries have much smaller growth volatility than the developing 
countries. Using the dynamic panel threshold model, I find that financial sector 
development significantly reduces growth volatility, especially in its lower regime. 
Financial sector development magnifies the shock of inflation volatility towards growth 
volatility in its higher regime. My results reveal the importance of keeping financial 
sector development at an optimal level, which is beneficial to reduce aggregate 
fluctuations and dampen the inflation shocks.  
The fourth chapter examines the asymmetric roles of bank credit on the business 
cycle by using international evidence. The empirical results present that bank credit is 
pro-cyclical and amplifies the business cycle. This effect is larger in the economic peak 
and trough, which forms a U-shaped curve. The U-shaped influences are robust for 
alternative financial factors, including M2 supply and stock price. This paper contributes 
to explore the distinct roles of bank credit on the economy in different business cycle 
phases. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationships among financial sector development, economic growth and stability 
are widely investigated. There are three main strands of these papers to explore this field. 
Regarding financial sector development and economic growth, it is thought that a healthy 
financial sector can help allocate capital to the highest valued investments without 
substantial risk of loss and large transaction costs. It can also reduce the cost of external 
finance and overcome informational asymmetries, allowing firms to partake in 
worthwhile investment opportunities and more easily reduce investment in liquid but 
unproductive assets (Schumpeter, 1912; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 1997; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
In the case of financial sector development and economic stability, some papers 
investigate the roles of financial sector development on the growth volatility and 
document how financial sector development can smoothen investment, consumption, 
diversify portfolios, manage production risks, generate information about the risks and 
returns of investments and then decrease growth volatility (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; King and Levine, 1993, Obstfeld, 1994; Acemoglu and Ziliboti, 1997; Levine, 
1997). Aghion et al. (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001) and Denizer et al. 
(2002) argue that financial sector development can absorb economic shocks. Bernanke 
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and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) document that market 
imperfections and restrictions can amplify macroeconomic shocks. Meanwhile, 
Schumpeter (1934) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) emphasize the close relationship 
between the financial cycle and the business cycle. Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) find that financial factors can amplify business cycle fluctuations and 
the roles played by movements in credit and asset price in shaping macroeconomic 
aggregate changes over the business cycle. 
Inspired from these classical papers, I investigate a number of topics. The first is to 
explore the roles of the Chinese banking system and the 2008 economic stimulus plan in 
the Chinese economic recovery. It is known that the Great Recession significantly harms 
the Chinese economy that depends on its exports. In order to prevent the Chinese 
economy from slowing down further, with the goal of a growth rate above 8%, the 
Chinese government launches the “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” in November 2008. It 
is estimated that the new growth of the bank credit in China reaches about RMB 14.6 
trillion. The effects of such policies, however, depend on how the Chinese banking 
system utilizes this additional liquidity. Within this picture, in order to identify these real 
effects of Chinese banking system and “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan”, using firm-level 
data from China, I search for the main determinants of firm-level output, employment 
and investment. The results show that firm output, employment and investment have a 
significant interaction. I find that banking health ratios and credit supply, together with 
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the increase in government expenditure, are the main determinants of these three main 
firm activities, especially for firm investment.  
Second, I investigate which firms have benefited more from these financial and 
fiscal policies, after controlling for some external economic factors. The results show 
that a healthy banking system and credit supply are more effective on the investment of 
larger firms and state-owned firms but their roles on output are less on the smaller firms 
and private firms. A healthy banking system and credit supply are shown to be more 
effective on the high- and medium-liability firms in regards to output and investment. 
Besides, higher profitable firms receive more credit support compared to medium and 
low profitable firms. In the end, by taking advantage of the impulse reaction functions, I 
explore the dynamic interaction of firm-level output, employment and investment and 
dynamic effects from financial, fiscal policies and external economic factors. The results 
also show that three firm-level indicators have the dynamic significant interaction. 
Furthermore, firm-level output, employment and investment positively respond to the 
shocks of financial and fiscal policies but the positive shocks converge very quickly in 
around 2 years. It shows that Chinese financial and fiscal policies work temporarily 
during the Great Recession (2008-2009). 
The second chapter investigates the important effects of financial sector development 
on the growth volatility and explores whether financial sector development magnifies or 
dampens the economic shocks. By investigating the growth volatility in the 50 countries 
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from 1997 to 2014, I find that growth volatility in the world exhibits a declining trend 
but increases during the South American Economic Crisis (2002-2003), the Global 
Financial Crisis (2008-2009) and the European Debt Crisis (2010-2012). The advanced 
countries have smaller growth volatility than emerging countries. By applying the 
dynamic panel threshold model, it is evident that growth volatility has a significant 
positive first lagged autocorrelation pattern. Financial sector development could reduce 
growth volatility in the lower regime by using the proxies of banking credit and health 
indicators. Regarding the shock of inflation volatility, I confirm that financial sector 
development can magnify its effect to the growth volatility in the higher regime, 
especially in the advanced countries. Furthermore, it is documented that economy size 
and trade openness have significant positive influences on the growth volatility.  
In the robustness tests, it is evident that financial openness, human capital 
investment, law and institution quality significantly reduce growth volatility. To handle 
the endogeneity in the models, I apply the first lagged inflation volatility and the central 
bank assets to GDP as the instrument variables to replace inflation volatility, 
respectively. The results acknowledge that my results are very robust, that is, inflation 
volatility positively affects the growth volatility and excessive financial sector 
development magnifies the shock of inflation volatility on the growth volatility. Overall, 
my paper contributes to reveal the importance of financial sector development on the 
aggregate fluctuations in the global perspective.  
  5 
Considering the co-movement between financial factors and the business cycle, I 
examine the asymmetric roles of bank credit on the business cycle by using international 
evidence. The results show that bank credit is pre-cyclical and greatly amplifies the 
business cycle in this peak and trough, which forms a U-shaped curve. Compared with 
the advanced and emerging counties, it is evident that the effects of bank credit are larger 
in the emerging countries than advanced countries. The business cycle after the financial 
crisis is less fluctuated because of the higher capital requirement and the more 
risk-sensitiveness standard. 
 In the robustness tests, the U-shaped effects of bank credit on the business cycle are 
also significant after using additional control variables and regarding the dynamics of the 
business cycle. Besides, I find that the effects of bank credit on the business cycle 
gradually diminish as time goes by. After using other alternative financial factors, 
including M2 supply and stock price, this paper suggests that the effects of M2 supply 
and stock price also shows a U-shaped curve, which shows that financial factors play a 
larger effect in the economic recessions and booms. Overall, this paper contributes to 
exploring the distinct roles of financial factors on the economy in the different business 
cycle phases in the global perspective. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. THE ROLES OF THE CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM AND 2008 ECONOMIC 
STIMULUS PLAN IN THE CHINESE ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
 2.1 Introduction 
The Great Recession has significantly harmed the Chinese economy, which depends 
on the country’s exports. In the first three quarters of 2008, Chinese GDP growth rate 
dropped to about 9% (from the peak levels of about 15.4%) and is predicted to decline 
further. In order to prevent the Chinese economy from further slowing down, with the goal 
of a growth rate above 8%, the Chinese government has launched the “RMB 4-trillion 
stimulus plan” in November 2008. In addition, the Chinese central bank has cut the 
benchmark interest rate, the deposit reserve ratio and has abolished the credit constraints of 
the commercial banks to achieve steady growth of credit and increase the liquidity in 
financial institutions; it has been estimated that the new growth of the bank credit in China 
has reached about RMB 14.6 trillion (RMB 4.7 trillion in 2008 and RMB 9.6 trillion in 
2009). The effects of such policies, however, depend on how the Chinese banking system 
has utilized this additional liquidity. 
In this context, I investigate the roles of the Chinese banking system and Chinese 2008 
economic stimulus plan on the Chinese economic recovery from the Great Recession to 
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2014
1
. My motivation is based on two strands of literature. The first strand is earlier studies 
focusing on the positive effects of a healthy banking system on increasing the allocation 
efficiency to the highest valued investments, reducing the cost of external finance and 
transaction costs, and promoting economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; Levine, 1997; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998); such positive effects are also reflected in credit quality and 
quantity (Bernanke, 1983; Hasan et al., 2009; Koetter and Wedow, 2010). The second 
strand refers that the Chinese banking system is influenced by the government to serve 
both political and economic goals and sometimes have to finance state-owned enterprises 
in loss (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013). In 
addition, the Chinese banking system is also regarded to play a essential role on funding 
government expenditure in “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” and following the loosened 
monetary policy and signals from the central government to increase bank credit supply to 
promote economic recovery (Wen and Wu, 2014; Liu et al., 2018).   
In order to identify these real effects of the Chinese banking system and “RMB 
4-trillion stimulus plan”, using firm-level data from China, I search for the main 
determinants of firm-level output, employment and investment. The results show that firm 
output, employment and investment have significant interaction. The increase in firm 
employment and investment positively affects output but the positive role of investment on 
output is weak. The increased firm output reversely promotes the growth of employment 
                                                          
1 The 2008 Chinese economic stimulus plan is a RMB 4 trillion (US$586 billion) stimulus package 
announced by the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 9 November 2008 as an attempt to 
minimize the impact of the global financial crisis on China. 
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and investment. Furthermore, I find that banking health ratios (i.e., asset liquidity, capital 
adequacy ratio, profitability, and bad loan ratio) and credit supply, together with the 
increase in government expenditure, are the main determinants of these three main firm 
activities, especially for firm investment. It is implied that the Chinese banking system and 
the economic stimulus plan have played essential roles to stimulate investment and helps 
for the Chinese economic recovery from the Great Recession to 2014.  
Second, I investigate which firms have benefited more from these financial and fiscal 
policies, after controlling for some external economic factors. My motivation is based on 
studies focusing on the role of firm characteristics (such as size or ownership) on credit 
constraints in the case of different countries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Galindo and 
Schiantarelli, 2003; Huang, 2008; Chan et al., 2012; Poncet et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2018). I 
base my investigation on firm-specific characteristics such as size, liability ratio, 
profitability, ownership and industry. The results show that a healthy banking system and 
credit supply are more effective on the investment of larger firms and state-owned firms 
but their roles on output are smaller than smaller firms and private firms, which reflect the 
low financial constraints and investment efficiency for larger firms and state-owned firms. 
Regarding the liability ratio of firms, a healthy banking system and credit supply are shown 
to be more effective on the high- and medium-liability firms on output and investment. 
Besides, higher profitable firms receive more credit support compared to medium and low 
profitable firms.   
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Regarding the industry of firms, consistent with the “top ten industry revitalization 
plan” promulgated by the Chinese government in early 2009, certain industries have 
benefited more from financial and fiscal policies.
2
 Fiscal policy through the increase in 
government expenditure is shown to be effective on firm-level output, employment and 
investment, regardless of the size, liability ratio, profitability, ownership and industry of 
firms, although the magnitude of such effects are shown to depend on these firm 
characteristics. Net export and US financial market performance also affect the various 
types of Chinese firms. I also compare the roles of financial and fiscal policies in the Great 
Recession (2008-2009) and recovery period (2010-2014) and observe that the positive 
roles of financial and fiscal policies are much larger in the Great Recession than recovery 
period. It supports the success of “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” in the Great Recession but 
the effect of these polices diminishes very quickly.  
In the end, by taking advantage of the impulse reaction functions, I explore the 
dynamic interaction of firm-level output, employment and investment and dynamic effects 
from financial, fiscal policies and external economic factors. The result also present that 
three firm-level indicators have dynamic significant interaction. Furthermore, firm-level 
output, employment and investment positively respond to the shocks of financial and fiscal 
                                                          
2 The existing literature has also focused on the roles of financial development on certain industries 
(Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000). This paper is connected to such 
studies as well by showing that industries such as agriculture, utility, manufacturing and transportation and 
warehousing industries are heavily supported by banking credit in China, in line with the government 
policies. Within this picture, it is also shown that a large amount of credit is provided for real estate and 
construction industries due to vast investment profits, feeding the overheating in the Chinese housing 
market.  
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policies but the positive shocks converge very quickly in around 2 years. The explanation 
capacities of financial and fiscal policies are very large for firm investment but are not 
large for output in line with the results of the variance decomposition. Both results mean 
that the effects of Chinese financial and fiscal policies might be led by Chinese government 
so that these effects are temporary and are not very effective on output. 
Starting from 1980, the Chinese government carried on a series of bank reforms to 
promote financial development, including establishing four state-owned specialized banks 
to implement the government plan and control credit size (1980-1993), promoting the 
transition of the state-owned banks to the commercial banks and setting up some 
joint-stock commercial banks (1993-1997), helping strip the non-performing assets to 
further improve performance (1997-2003) and injecting the fund to solve bad loan 
problems in 2003. After the reforms mentioned so far, Chinese commercial banks achieved 
large improvements. By the end of 2007, nonperforming loan ratio of the state-owned 
commercial banks was 3%, which was far below the level before the reform. Capital 
adequacy ratio was higher than the requirements of the Basel capital adequacy. Besides, by 
the initial public offering, four state-owned banks built a market-oriented mechanism to 
standardize the information disclosure and strengthen the duties regulation on the senior 
management. These were important policies to achieve a well-organized banking system. 
However, it is documented that the Chinese banking system is influenced by the 
government, especially with some objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats, to serve 
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both political and economic goals (Cull and Xu, 2003). Meanwhile, the Chinese banking 
system is dominated by the government through direct and indirect state ownership, while 
these banks’ lending decisions often reflect government-dictated policies and have to 
finance state-owned enterprises, which sometimes are in loss (Allen et al., 2005; Firth et 
al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013).  
Facing the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government announced the “RMB 
4-trillion stimulus plan”. In the government investment, central government directly 
provided 1.18 trillion, accounting for 29.5% of the whole investment, and the rest was 
allocated from provincial, local governments
3
. A loosening of monetary policy provided 
banks enough liquidity and credit to support investment. To be specific, by cutting the 
benchmark interest rate, deposit reserve ratio and abolishing credit constraints of the 
commercial banks, the liquidity in financial institutions increased. Meanwhile, the 
announcement of “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” was regarded to send a very powerful 
signal to the government-controlled banking system that banks should guarantee the 
growth of the Chinese economy. It was estimated that bank credit grew by 4.7 trillion RMB 
in 2008, and grew more than double to 9.6 trillion RMB in 2009.  
The introduction of the 2008 economic stimulus plan mentioned above clearly shows 
that the Chinese banking system plays an essential role to fund government fiscal 
                                                          
3 The most of government investment was distributed in transport and power infrastructure (37.5%) 
and post-earthquake construction (25%). Other items covered affordable housing (10%), technological 
innovation and structural adjustment (9.25%), rural village infrastructure (9.25%), environmental 
investment (5.25%) and health and education (3.75%). 
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expenditure by following loosed monetary policies and increasing liquidity of credit. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to examine the implications of these financial policies and 
fiscal policies on firm-level output, employment and investment based on banking and 
financial indicators such as banking asset liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, profitability, 
bad loan ratio, credit supply, government expenditure. Regarding international policies, the 
effects of Chinese net export and US financial market are also considered. 
There is an established literature based on the roles of the financial sector on economic 
growth. It is widely thought that a healthy financial sector can help allocate capital to the 
highest valued investments without substantial risk of loss and large transaction costs. It 
can also reduce the cost of external finance and overcome informational asymmetries, 
allowing firms to partake in worthwhile investment opportunities and more easily to reduce 
investment in liquid but unproductive assets (Schumpeter, 1912; Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 1997).  Focusing on whether the banking system can efficiently 
reallocate capital and fasten economic growth, Hasan et al. (2009) find that an 
improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth than does an 
identical increase in the quantity of credit. Koetter and Wedow (2010) show that most 
finance-growth studies approximate the size of the financial systems rather than the quality 
of intermediation to explain economic growth differentials. They find the bank’s 
intermediation quality estimated by bank-specific efficiency has a significantly positive 
effect on growth. Especially, Bernanke (1983) highlights the roles the quality of credit 
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intermediation plays in the Great Depression to help to explain a slow recovery of the 
1930s. Chang et al. (2010) or Zhang et al. (2012) have also focused on the positive 
relationship between financial development, healthy banking system, and economic 
growth in China. 
Considering the casual link with financial development and economic growth, Love 
(2003) finds that financial development reduces the reliance of corporate investments on 
internal funds, thus promoting capital accumulation and growth. Love and Zicchino (2006) 
uses firm-level data to demonstrate how the link between finance and growth operates on 
the level of the firm and find financial development has an immediate effect on efficient 
allocation of capital via investment. Wang (2014) uses the data of ASEAN’s 5 countries to 
explore a direct impact on the level of corporate investments and an indirect impact 
through alleviating external financing constraints from financial development. It is thought 
that investment is an essential link connecting financial development and economic 
growth. In the case of China, Lang et al. (1996) and Chen et al. (2011) observe that optimal 
bank lending reinforces firms’ investment efficiency, while politically based soft lending 
may bias firms’ behavior with regard to investment decisions. Furthermore, Fama and 
French (1998) and Chen et al. (2009) find that firms’ investment decisions significantly 
influence firm performance because the gains from investments enhance firm profitability. 
Employment is also an important connection with financial development, investment 
and economic growth. It is thought that the credit supply growth can incentivize the firms 
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to invest more, expand their businesses and enlarge size. The decrease in the cost of 
external finance could also result in investment growth and it allows firms to hire more 
employees due to the complementariness between labor and capital. In the corresponding 
empirical literature, Garmaise (2008) argues that the cost and availability of external 
finance have ambiguous effects on employment. On the one hand, easing financing 
constraints may allow firms to optimally substitute capital for labor by investing in more 
capital-intensive technologies and decrease employment; while on the other hand, a 
decrease in the cost of external finance will increase firm-level investment. With the 
growth of the investment and complement of labor and capital, the demand for labor goes 
up. Pagano and Pica (2012) use the size of the credit market as a proxy for financial 
development and suggest that the labor requires financing and a more efficient credit 
market increases employment even if investment levels remain constant. Chodorow-Reich 
(2014) concludes that the predicted change in employment varies by about 5 percentage 
points depending on the health of its lenders. The frictions can account for about one-third 
to one-half of the decline in employment at small and medium firms in the 2007-2009 
crisis.  
In the empirical investigation of the effect of the 2008 Chinese economic stimulus plan 
on the economic recovery, Wen and Wu (2014) show that implementation of the Chinese 
stimulus plan is further aided by the soaring fixed asset investment made by Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOE). The Chinese state-owned banks vigorously expanded their 
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lending as Chinese central bank relaxed the lending constraints, and SOEs greatly raised 
their average leverage ratio. Ouyang and Peng (2015) use the treatment-effect estimation 
on the effects of the 2008 economic stimulus package of China. The results show that the 
stimulus had a temporary boost in economic activities for about two years. Liu et al. (2018) 
use firm-level data to investigate the results of economic stimulus package in China and 
find that state-owned enterprises (SOE) receive more bank loans and invest more than 
non-SOEs. However, state-owned enterprises (SOE) have weaker relationships between 
bank loans and firm profitability and between investment expenditure and investment 
opportunities than non-SOEs. 
The roles played by a healthy banking system in the economic growth, employment 
and investment in economic recovery cannot be neglected. Besides, the financial and fiscal 
polices incentivize the Chinese firms in the short term and tend to support the state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). This paper also contributes to further exploring interaction of output, 
employment and investment on the effects of Chinese financial and fiscal polices by using 
firm-level data, which helps to build the causal link with financial development and 
economic growth in the Chinese case. 
Many firm characteristics have been shown to play roles in firm credit constraints. 
Regarding the size of the firm, the literature has shown that small firms have less access to 
external finance and are more constrained in their internal financing, both in the 
developing and developed countries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Galindo and Schiantarelli, 
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2003). Schiffer and Weder (2001) show that small firms consistently report higher 
financing obstacles than medium-size or large firms. Beck et al. (2006) observe that size, 
age and ownership are the most reliable predictors on the firms’ financing obstacles. 
Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2011) find that firms with large employment size experience 
a large decline in credit rationing probability since employment size could be a signal for 
firms’ ability to repay the loan, implying that size has a detrimental effect on the likelihood 
of credit constraining. Besides, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Whited and Wu (2006) and 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) employ combinations of observable firm characteristics to 
measure financial constraints firms face, such as size, age, or leverage.  
In the related literature, Modigliani and Miller (1958) have suggested that both firm 
value and investment decisions are strongly affected by their capital structure in imperfect 
capital markets. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the 
external investors ask firms a higher price on the new debt capital due to firms’ hidden 
information and opportunistic behavior. From asymmetric information aspect, according 
to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), high liability ratios show that firms have good investments 
with higher returns compared to the interest rate, which offers a signal to remove the 
asymmetric information in the loan market and explain the existence of limited access to 
credit. Jensen (1986) claims that external debt can be considered as an effective way to 
reduce the agency cost problems that may lead to the underperformance of firms. In these 
circumstances, resorting to external financiers may provide managers the right incentives 
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to avoid cash wasting policies and thus finally result in better firm performances. Huynh 
and Petrunia (2010) also find that there is a positive and nonlinear relationship between 
leverage and firm’s growth by using listed and unlisted Canadian manufacturing firms; 
however, high leverage may lead to low growth due to costly new debt and increase the 
financing constraints (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 
2005). 
Regarding the firm profitability for financial constraints, Whited and Wu (2006) and 
Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2011) suggest that firms with higher sales growth and higher 
profitability are less likely to be credit constrained. Similarly, Campello et al. (2010) and 
Lin et al. (2011) find that firm profitability, sales growth and cash flow over assets are an 
important consideration for banks to make loan, especially in the financial crisis. In the 
case of China, Cull and Xu (2003) use the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) data and 
find bank finance is positively linked to SOE profitability and reforms but this association 
is not strong. Firth et al. (2009) find that a firm’s profitability is used as a criterion in 
granting loans and in determining loan size by using survey data in China. 
In the ownership aspect, Faccio et al. (2006), Claessens et al. (2008) and Faccio (2010) 
show that politically-connected firms are more likely to be bailed out in the form of more 
access to bank loans when they face financial difficulties compared to similar but 
non-politically connected firms. In the case of China, Chan et al. (2012) find that 
politically-connected firms display no financing constraints, whereas firms without 
  18 
political connection experience significant constraints. Huang (2008) shows that although 
private Chinese firms that have suffered from the allocation of credit are in a better position 
since 1998, credit constraints are still present. Poncet et al. (2010) find that private firms 
face the highest degree of financial constraints, whereas state-owned enterprises do not 
experience any financial constraint; in China, credit constraints for private firms are shown 
to be reinforced when the presence of state-owned firms is strong. 
Regarding the sector heterogeneity, financial development has been shown to have 
distinct effects on different industries in the corresponding literature. It is shown that 
financial development can meet the funding needs of certain industries and promote 
development through supporting corporate innovation, new technology application and 
upgrading the technological level. For instance, Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) show that low 
credit constraints could satisfy the need for external financing and thus contribute to the 
growth of related industries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use industry-level data and find 
that the development of the financial system directly promotes industrial growth through 
reducing the cost of external financing to financially dependent firms. Wurgler (2000) uses 
the data of 65 countries and finds that well-developed financial markets help improve the 
efficiency of capital allocation, allow for the growth of the industry to invest more capital 
and promote the optimization of industrial structure. This strongly supports the 
significance of the financial development on the growth of the industries.  
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Within this literature, I find that a healthy banking system can affect the firm-level 
output, employment and investment. Since firms with different size, liability ratio, 
profitability and ownership face different financing constraints, by using firm-level 
Chinese data, I investigate which firms have benefited more from the Chinese banking 
system and 2008 economic stimulus plan from the Great Recession to 2014.
4
 
2.2 Empirical methodology and data 
2.2.1 Economic channels and regression models 
I would like to capture the transmission channels of the Chinese banking system on the 
Chinese economy given in Figure 2.1. In particular, credit supply in the banking system 
depends on the financial policies as well as the health of the banking system based on the 
ratios such as liquidity, capital adequate ratio, profitability and bad loan ratio. Furthermore, 
bank credit supply affects the firm-level output, employment and investment. Firms are 
also influenced by fiscal policies and external economic factors, such as net export and US 
financial market performance.  
In the transmission channels in Figure 2.1, I think firm output, employment and 
investment interacts with each other. Specifically, the increase in employment and 
investment contributes to output growth; the increased output reversely lead to the growth 
of employment and investment. Meanwhile, employment and investment might have the 
                                                          
4 I do not use age to categorize firms, since all the firms are public listed.  
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substitution (negative) or complement (positive) relationships. Second, I hypothesize that 
healthy banking system, credit supply, government expenditure and external economic 
factors could influence these three firm-level variables. Specifically, banking indicators, 
government expenditure and external economic factors affect firm output by its demand 
side. These variables also affect firm output by influencing employment and investment. 
Therefore, I consider firm output, employment and investment as endogenous variables 
and banking indicators, the government expenditure and external economic factors as 
exdogenous variables
5
.  
Figure 2.1 Transmission channels of money, credit and banking system in the economy 
 
In order to capture such transmission channels in Figure 2.1, my empirical strategy is 
to use the panel VAR (vector autoregression) at the firm level to estimate the effects of the 
                                                          
5 Since the sample I use only covers the public listed companies, which occupies the small portion of 
the whole economy, I do not think that their activities can drive the change of financial and fiscal policies. 
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banking system, the government expenditure and external economic factors on the firm 
output, employment and investment.
6
 The advantage of panel VAR lies that it can examine 
the interactions among firm output, employment and investment that will be independent 
of any endogeneity problem. Simultaneously, the panel VAR explores the roles of other 
exogenous variables. Therefore, I use the panel VAR to estimate my system of dynamic 
panel models. The system of dynamic panel models is shown as:  
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where OUTPUT refers to log firm output, EMP refers to log firm employment, INVEST 
refers to log firm investment; together with firm fixed effects i that are fixed across time 
periods (in order to control for firm-specific characteristics), these are the only firm-level 
indicators that I consider in the benchmark case. In my heterogeneity tests, I consider the 
very same regression framework for alternative firm size, liability ratio, profitability, and 
ownership as well as 13 different industries in my sample; such an investigation is 
important to capture any possible nonlinearity within my empirical framework. The 
                                                          
6 The Stata package I use to estimate the panel VAR model is from Abrigo and Love (2015). 
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remaining indicators (that I discuss in details, below) are common across firms and have 
been included in the analysis in order to investigate the effects of the banking system, 
government expenditure, Chinese net export and US financial market performance on the 
firms.
7
 
In the banking system, regarding the indicators of a healthy banking system, HEA 
means the banking health ratio. It is built through the factor analysis by using banking asset 
liquidity (LIQ), capital adequacy ratio (CAPT), profitability (PROF) and bad loan ratio 
(BAD). These variables are in line with the CAMELS rating system, which covers capital 
adequacy, assets, management capability, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity; I also 
consider the Basel II, which covers capital requirements, leverage ratio and liquidity 
requirements. Correspondingly, Bernanke (1983), Diamond and Rajan (2011), and 
Caballero and Simsek (2013) show liquidity, insolvency, and the prevalence of bank 
failures matter and can deepen economic crises or slow recovery. Jin et al. (2011) show that 
nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions help determine the prevalence of bank failures. 
Regarding the bank credit, LOAN refers to credit supply. 
On top of these variables, SPEN is the government expenditure capturing the direct 
effects of fiscal policies. Considering the external economic influences, I employ the 
Chinese net export (TRADE) and US stock market performance (STOCK). It is important 
                                                          
7 In line with results from moment and model selection criteria (MMSC) (Andrews and Lu, 2001), I 
set the number of lags k for output, employment and investment equal to three in order to maximize the 
statistics. The panel fixed-effects are removed by using the Helmert transformation (known as forward 
orthogonal deviation) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
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to emphasize that the banking/financial indicators, government expenditure and external 
economic factors are all included with their first lags in order to avoid any endogeneity 
problem. 
Table 2.1 Variables and their meanings 
Variable type Variables Meanings 
Bank credit LOAN Credit supply 
Healthy banking system 
LIQ Liquidity 
CAPT Capital adequacy ratio 
PROF Profitability 
BAD Bad loan ratio 
Government fiscal policy SPEN Government expenditure 
External economic factors 
TRADE Net export  
STOCK US stock market performance 
2.2.2 Data 
The data are collected from Wind (A Chinese data services provider) and Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics (i.e., both firm-level data and nationwide statistics). I collect 
US financial market performance data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. I select 
1535 firms from all the public listed firms (about 3200 firms) in the Chinese A-share stock 
market (Shanghai and Shenzheng Stock Exchanges) to keep strongly balanced panel. I use 
firm revenue to reflect firm output, number of firm employees to reflect firm employment 
and net capital expenditure to reflect firm investment
8
. In my heterogeneity tests, I also 
consider other firm-level data, namely firm asset, asset-liability ratio, return on equity 
                                                          
8 I use net capital expenditure (cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term 
assets less cash receipts from selling these assets and depreciation) to proxy firm investment. Since some 
values of net capital expenditure are negative, I use linear transformation to make all the values positive. 
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(profitability) and ownership. Nationwide variables regarding healthy banking ratio, bank 
credit, government expenditure, Chinese net export and US financial market performance 
are given in Table 2.1.  
Specifically, I use loan/GDP to reflect credit supply (LOAN), return on equity of 
Chinese banking system to reflect profitability (PROF). I also use growth of government 
expenditure to reflect government expenditure (EXPE), net export/GDP to measure net 
export (TRADE) and S&P 500 index returns to measure US financial market performance 
(STOCK). Considering firms with different characteristics, I split the firms in line with 
size, liability, profitability and ownership from Panel A to Panel D. I find that firms with 
large size, high liability and high profitability have much larger output, employment and 
investment than the other types of firms with medium and small features, especially for 
investment. Panel D in Table 2.2 depicts that output (452.089), employment (5588.563) 
and investment (13.456) in state-owned firms are much higher compared to private firms; 
the difference between state-owned and private firms is about 7 times in output and 1.6 
times in employment and even about 10 times in investment
9
. These present the huge 
difference for firms with different characteristics, especially for their investment.  
Since different industrial sectors may obtain different credit supports by Chinese 
banks, I also split the firms in line with the Industry Classification Guideline made by 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The list of 13 industry sectors in this 
                                                          
9 The state-owned firms include central state-owned firms and local state-owned firms. Some firms 
belong to other types of ownerships, such as foreign-owned firms and collective firms. Since the number of 
foreign-owned firms and collective firms is very few, I do not explore them.  
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paper is given in Panel E in Table 2.2 which also provides descriptive statistics of the 
corresponding firms. As is evident, there are three industries that have the highest share in 
output, employment and investment; these are Mining Industry (MIN), Financial & 
Insurance Industry (FIN), and Construction Industry (CON). Therefore, I think there is a 
good amount of heterogeneity across firms due to size, liability, profitability, ownership 
and industry. 
The data I use in this paper are quarterly from 2008 to 2014 and cover both firm-level 
data and nationwide statistics. The period selection considers the policy regime change, 
since the Chinese government carried out a new 10 trillion stimulus in 2015, and banking 
system indicators changed extensively. In order to have a healthy empirical investigation 
that is robust to outliers, I apply the Hodrick–Prescott filter ( =1600) to delete time trend 
and seasonality; I also winsorize the highest 2.5% and the lowest 2.5% of the firm-level 
observations in output, employment and investment, since some Chinese firms manage 
earnings in the different quarters, especially in the fourth quarter in one year. 
As is evident in Figure 2.2, this is a perfect period for my investigation regarding the 
effects of the Chinese banking system on both the drop and the recovery of the Chinese 
economy. In particular, from the first quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009, GDP 
annual growth rate drops from 11.3% to 8.2%, and it recovers through the last quarter of 
2010 with a growth rate of 10.4%, which is followed by movement of Chinese net export. 
As is evident in Figure 2.2, the employment growth drops from 2.5% in the first quarter of 
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2008 to 1% in the third quarter of 2009. However, the fixed asset investment growth rate 
rises from about 25.9% through the beginning of 2008 to about 30.5% in the last quarter of 
2009. It supports that “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” stimulates Chinese economy through 
greatly promoting fix asset investment. After 2010, Chinese GDP growth slows down from 
10% in 2011 to 7% in 2014 while the fixed asset growth also continues decreasing, which 
reveals the temporary effects of Chinese economic stimulus plan for the Chinese economic 
growth. However, the employment continues to grow around 7% per year from 2011 to 
2014.
10
                                                          
10 The employment and fixed asset investment are collected in the Chinese urban regions and 
eliminate the outliers.  
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of firms’ characteristics 
    Output  Employment  Investment 
  Obs  Mean Std  Mean Std  Mean Std 
Panel A            
Firms with large size  12908  878.995 3782.916  8809.797 22579.399  35.989 213.675 
Firms with medium size  17164  62.393 70.917  3539.382 5551.074  1.135 2.400 
Firms with small size  12908  19.019 24.595  2405.060 5464.748  0.296 0.995 
Panel B            
Firms with high liability   12908  474.525 1514.489  5036.659 9984.215  25.350 191.819 
Firms with medium liability  18424  254.521 2425.298  5328.708 18476.349  5.159 41.367 
Firms with low liability  12908  168.013 2154.318  3389.661 6593.586  5.737 84.038 
Panel C            
Firms with high profitability   12908  648.978 3730.787  6061.206 19446.631  28.880 211.153 
Firms with medium profitability  18424  170.954 676.493  4466.523 11286.744  5.192 32.346 
Firms with low profitability  12908  104.681 312.461  3920.815 7383.580  2.010 10.565 
Panel D            
State-owned firms  23016  452.089 2843.990  5588.563 16749.820  13.456 128.131 
Private firms  15288  64.885 156.100  3391.504 6977.723  1.301 5.596 
Panel E            
Agriculture and Relevant Industry (ARI)  700  3.183 4.993  2704.487 3221.271  0.848 1.494 
Manufacturing Industry (MAN)  23996  16.341 52.915  4658.968 8510.614  2.791 10.423 
Utility Industry (UTI)  2268  17.085 41.414  4231.533 8640.398  11.302 36.667 
Mining Industry (MIN)  1512  221.793 990.727  12974.000 49676.385  58.227 267.062 
Construction Industry (CON)  1120  106.762 327.101  4550.933 8869.663  8.677 27.522 
Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA)  1736  24.705 51.809  4322.153 11102.158  10.506 26.421 
Information Technology Industry (INF)  1540  13.834 78.424  6856.022 27899.799  8.665 67.342 
Wholesale & Retail Trade Industry (WHO)  3136  26.414 54.340  4138.948 6317.545  1.628 5.380 
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Financial & Insurance Industry (FIN)  1092  172.498 326.779  6640.779 11249.399  230.149 620.057 
Real Estate Industry (EST)  3248  9.748 34.259  3639.997 8478.039  1.577 7.489 
Social Service Industry (SOC)  1568  4.419 10.770  2930.137 3898.593  1.857 7.586 
Communication & Culture Industry (COM)  500  3.886 4.963  2499.175 3075.594  1.153 2.625 
Conglomerate Industry (CONG)  560  4.034 3.822  2751.742 2352.449  0.477 2.303 
Notes: The industry classification on the public listed firms is based on the Industry Classification Guideline in China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). The unit of output is 10 million RMB and the unit of investment is 100 million RMB. 
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Figure 2.2 The trend of the macroeconomic variables from 2008 to 2014 
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Regarding the relationship between Chinese economic activity and the banking system 
in Figure 2.2, the recovery in GDP coincides with the increase in credit supply, capital 
adequacy ratio, profitability and with the reduction in bad loan ratio. It is implied that the 
improvement of the Chinese economic activity coincides with the improvement in the 
banking performance. The growth of government expenditure is also related to the 
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recovery of Chinese GDP in Figure 2.2, showing evidence of the importance of fiscal 
policy.  
Table 2.3 Correlation coefficients of credit and banking health indicators 
 LIQ CAPT BAD PROF LOAN 
LIQ 1     
CAPT 0.742*** 1    
BAD -0.492*** -0.792*** 1   
PROF -0.072*** 0.043*** 0.156*** 1  
LOAN 0.005 -0.130*** -0.246*** -0.094*** 1 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The sample covers all 
the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. All the variables are removed by trend and 
seasonality.  
In order to understand better the transmission channels of the banking system and 
credit on the Chinese economy, I also calculate their correlation coefficients among the 
variables of banking system and credit in Table 2.3. As is evident, liquidity (LIQ), capital 
adequacy ratio (CAPT), profitability (PROF) and bad loan ratio (BAD) have significant 
correlation coefficients with credit supply (LOAN). It is implied that a healthy banking 
system is significantly correlated with the growth of credit supply. In details, bad loan ratio 
and profitability have a significant negative impact on the credit supply, meaning that 
higher bad loan ratio and profitability make firms act in a more prudent way regarding 
credit supply. Similarly, higher capital adequacy ratio can decrease the credit supply since 
banks have to reduce credit when they have enough total bank reserve. Nevertheless, a 
formal analysis is required in order to see the interaction between these variables and 
firm-level indicators, which is pursued next. 
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2.3 Empirical results 
2.3.1 Static analysis 
This section provides the results based on the panel VAR model. While the first 
subsection depicts the results of the benchmark case which considers the linear relationship 
between the banking indicators and firm-level output, employment, and investment, the 
second subsection depicts the results based on possible nonlinearities in this relationship 
based on firm characteristics for heterogeneity.
11
 
I employ the panel VAR model to analyze the Chinese banking system’s roles on the 
recovery of firm output, employment and investment. The results are given in Table 2.4. 
Since liquidity, capital adequate ratio, profitability and bad loan ratio (see Table 2.3) have 
strong correlations with each other, I employ a factor analysis to construct one index titled 
banking health ratio (HEA) in the regression model.
12
 Table 2.4 shows that firm-level 
output, employment and investment have a significant interaction. While firm investment 
has a weak positive effect on output, it has a significant positive influence on employment 
and then increases firm output. Besides, the increased output reversely promotes the 
growth of employment and investment, which forms the positive interaction with these 
three firm variables.  
                                                          
11 I also test the stability condition and Granger causality among the variables in the equation. I find 
that the panel VAR satisfies the stable condition and the variables in the RHS are Granger-causing 
variables.  
12 In the factor analysis, the estimated weights on liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, profitability ratio 
and bad loan ratio are 0.835, 0.952, -0.112 and -0.866, respectively.  
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Regarding the roles of the banking system, I find that banking health ratio enters all 
three regressions with a positive expected sign. It is evident that credit supply has 
significant positive impacts on the firm output. Government expenditure also has positive 
and significant effects on output. The results are very similar regarding the positive effects 
of banking health ratio, credit supply and government expenditure on firm employment 
and investment. It means that banking health, credit supply and government expenditure 
are beneficial for the growth of firm-level output, employment and investment. Further, I 
observe that the effects of credit supply and government expenditure on the investment are 
much larger than output, which shows the main stimulus from financial and fiscal polices 
lie on the investment. Besides, Chinese net export and US stock market performance have 
significant positive influences on the output, employment and investment, except the 
insignificant influences of US financial market performance on the output. 
Therefore, there is strong evidence for both bank credit and a healthy banking system 
to be effective in the promotion of firm-level output, employment and investment. 
Together with the significance of government expenditure in all regressions, it is implied 
that both the “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” and the bank credit growth of about RMB 
14.6 trillion have been effective for the recovery of Chinese firms, especially for 
investment (Liu et al., 2018). The results are in line with studies such as by Bernanke’s 
(1983), Hasan et al. (2009) and Koetter and Wedow (2010), who show the importance of 
banking health conditions on the economic recovery. 
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Table 2.4 Results on firm-level variables: Linear model 
  Output   Employment  Investment 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.182*** 0.178***  0.016*** 0.016***  0.021*** 0.020*** 
  (0.044) (0.044)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) 
EMP(-1)  0.116*** 0.120***  0.833*** 0.835***  -0.139*** -0.132*** 
  (0.044) (0.044)  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.015) (0.015) 
INVEST (-1)  0.019* 0.017  0.019*** 0.018***  0.384*** 0.385*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.010) 
HEA(-1)   0.048***   0.006***   0.051*** 
   (0.004)   (0.001)   (0.002) 
LOAN(-1)  0.108*** 0.106***  -0.0001 0.017***  0.266*** 0.322*** 
  (0.017) (0.021)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.008) 
SPEN(-1)  0.210*** 0.356***  0.037*** 0.041***  0.395*** 0.469*** 
  (0.050) (0.053)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.030) 
TRADE(-1)   0.638**   0.827***   2.417*** 
   (0.315)   (0.101)   (0.179) 
STOCK(-1)   0.031   0.029**   -0.130*** 
   (0.044)   (0.013)   (0.029) 
Observation  36840 36840  36840 36840  36840 36840 
N   1535 1535  1535 1535  1535 1535 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is 
estimated by white robust covariance. The model is estimated in first differences with third lagged 
instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. All the 
variables are removed by trend and seasonality. I do not report the influences of second and third lagged 
output, employment and investment because of the space limitations. 
Although the results provided above depict the linear relationship between banking 
indicators and firm-level output, employment and investment, their relationship can also 
be nonlinear because of the financial constraints for different firm-level characteristics 
such as firm size, liability, profitability, ownership or the industry that the firm belongs to. 
In this subsection, I investigate such possible nonlinearities in details. 
Earlier studies have found evidence suggesting firm size affects the firm’s access to 
credit, including Berger and Udell (1998), Schiffer and Weder (2001), Galindo and 
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Schiantarelli (2003), Beck et al. (2006) and Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2011). In order 
to connect my results to such studies, I split the firms in my sample into three groups, 
namely large size, medium size and small size.
13
 By using these groups, I run the Panel 
VAR model once again and obtain the results in Table 2.5. I find that firm investment does 
not have a significant positive impact on output while investment positively affects 
employment and then promote the output growth for medium- and small-size firms. On the 
other hand, the increased output reversely has a significant positive role on employment 
and investment for large-size firms. The positive role of investment on output is larger for 
medium- and small-size firms, which shows that large-size firms might have lower 
investment efficiency. The low reverse effects of output on investment for medium- and 
small-size firms show the difficulty to support investment through internal financing. 
Regarding the roles of banking system and credit indicators on firm output, 
employment and investment, it is evident that the banking health ratio and credit supply 
have positive and significant effects on firm output for all levels of firm size, with their 
bigger impacts on the medium- and small-size firms. Similar larger positive impacts are 
found in medium- and small-size firms in employment. However, in the firm investment, I 
find that the banking health ratio and credit supply have larger impacts on the firm 
investment in the large- and medium-size firms. The finding supports the argument that 
small-size firms have large financial constraints so that they can not invest enough. The 
                                                          
13 I divide all the firms with the highest 30%, the middle 40% and the lowest 30% and define the 
highest 30% as the firms with large size, the middle 40% as the firms with medium size and the lowest 
30% as the firms with small size.  
  35 
results also reveal the low investment efficiency for larger Chinese firms since the roles of 
the banking system and credit indicators on the output are smaller in large-size firms than 
medium- and small-size firms. I think that the low investment efficiency of state-owned 
firms may be a deep reason because they have much larger size (see Table 2.2).  
Furthermore, it is also evident that government expenditure has a positive impact on 
firm output, employment and investment for all levels of firm size. The positive influences 
are large in the investment of large-size firms but the positive influences are small in the 
output while the medium- and small-size firms meet the opposite situations. This finding 
also presents the low investment efficiency for large-size firms. Furthermore, net export 
has positive significant effects on the employment and investment of all level-size firms. 
The US stock market performance has more significant impacts on the large- and 
medium-size firms. 
The relationship between firms and banks may also depend on the liability ratio of the 
firms. In particular, high liability ratios show that firms have good investments with higher 
returns compared to the interest rate, which offers a signal to remove the asymmetric 
information in the loan market and to increase the access to credit (e.g., see Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, the positive relationship between high 
leverage and financing constraints may also harm a firm due to costly new debt (e.g. see 
McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 2005). In order to 
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investigate these alternative impacts, I split the firms in my sample by their liability ratio 
and run the panel VAR model
14
. 
Regarding the interaction of firm-level output, employment and investment, it is 
evident that investment positively affects employment and then increases output while 
investment does not have a significant and positive effect on output. Furthermore, I 
observe that the increased output reversely promotes the growth of employment and 
investment. The interaction of firm-level output, employment and investment is more 
significant for the firms with high liability.  
The corresponding results are shown in Table 2.6, where banking health ratio, credit 
supply have their positive effects on firm output, employment and investment. There is 
also evidence for a nonlinear relationship between the banking indicators and firm output; 
i.e., while the biggest impact of banking variables for output and investment is on high- 
and medium-liability firms. Regarding government expenditure, the largest impact of 
government expenditure in output and investment is on large- and medium-liability firms. 
These results are in line with studies such as by Huynh and Petrunia (2010) who find a 
positive and nonlinear relationship between leverage and firm’s growth by using listed and 
unlisted Canadian manufacturing firms. Meanwhile, it shows that firms with high liability 
undertake good investments with higher returns. Nevertheless, the results are not 
consistent with other studies such as by Lang et al. (1996), McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
                                                          
14 I divide all the firms with the highest 30%, the middle 40% and the lowest 30% and define the 
highest 30% as the firms with high liability, the middle 40% as the firms with medium liability and the 
lowest 30% as the firms with low liability. 
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or Aivazian et al. (2005) who show that high leverage may lead to low growth due to costly 
new debt and increases in financing constraints. Furthermore, net export and US stock 
market performance do not have significant positive impacts on the three groups. 
It is thought that firms with higher profitability are less likely to be credit constrained 
(e.g., see Whited and Wu, 2006; Campello et al., 2010; Drakos and Giannakopoulos, 2011; 
Lin et al., 2011) and state-owned enterprises (SOE) with high profitability tend to get loans 
from bank in China (e.g., see Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009). Therefore, to 
investigate such linkages, I split the firms into three groups in line with their earnings and 
profitability (ROE), that is, high profitable firms, medium profitable firms and low 
profitable firms
15
.  
Table 2.7 shows that investment has a positive expected effect on employment and 
then positively affects output while investment has not a positive and significant effect on 
output. Furthermore, I find that the increased output reversely promotes the growth of 
employment and investment. Table 2.7 also shows that banking health ratio has more 
significantly positive effects on the output of medium profitable and low profitable firms. 
The effects of credit supply are significantly positive on the output of three types of firms. 
I also find that banking health ratio and credit supply have much larger effects on the 
employment and investment for high profitable firms. It supports the opinion that the 
Chinese banking system tends to finance firms with high earnings growth and profitability; 
                                                          
15 I divide all the firms with the highest 30%, the middle 40% and the lowest 30% and define the 
highest 30% as the firms with high profitability, the middle 40% as the firms with medium profitability and 
the lowest 30% as the firms with low profitability. 
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firms with low earnings and profitability face the financing obstacle and constraints since 
the effects of banking system on investment of high profitable firms are much larger 
among the medium and low profitable firms.  
The similar finding is also shown in the effects of government expenditure. I observe 
that government expenditure positively affects all three types of firms. However, the effect 
of government expenditure on investment is largest in firms with high profitability, which 
presents these firms can easier obtain the supports from the Chinese government. 
Furthermore, net export and US financial market performance have more influences on 
output of low profitable firms and net export has positive and significant effects only on the 
investment of high and medium profitable firms. 
Earlier studies have also shown that ownership of a firm can influence its financial 
constraints (e.g., see Beck et al., 2006; Poncet et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2012). In China, the 
banking system is influenced by government and the banks’ lending decisions often reflect 
government-dictated policies rather than commercial judge and sometimes have to finance 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) which are in losses (e.g., see Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 
2005; Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2018) Accordingly, I split the firms in 
line with state ownership and private ownership and run the panel VAR model one more 
time.
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Table 2.5 Results on firm-level variables: Size 
  Output  Employment  Investment 
  Large size Medium size Small size  Large size Medium size Small size  Large size Medium size Small size 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.048 0.171*** 0.245***  0.042*** 0.010 0.005  0.031*** -0.007 0.001 
  (0.063) (0.050) (0.064)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.006) (0.002) 
EMP(-1)  0.012 0.133*** 0.225*  0.769*** 0.839*** 0.910***  -0.163*** -0.178*** -0.083*** 
  (0.051) (0.047) (0.117)  (0.052) (0.026) (0.034)  (0.030) (0.025) (0.014) 
INVEST (-1)  0.007 0.013 -0.010  0.011*** 0.020*** 0.023**  0.320*** 0.423*** 0.506*** 
  (0.015) (0.011) (0.037)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) 
HEA(-1)  0.053*** 0.055*** 0.068***  0.016*** 0.005*** 0.00002  0.144*** 0.066*** 0.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
LOAN(-1)  0.216*** 0.264*** 0.258***  0.042** 0.029*** 0.018*  1.187*** 0.497*** 0.213*** 
  (0.060) (0.046) (0.088)  (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.052) (0.025) (0.017) 
SPEN(-1)  0.270*** 0.356*** 0.466***  0.043 0.064*** 0.019  1.130*** 0.477*** 0.223*** 
  (0.094) (0.053) (0.129)  (0.031) (0.019) (0.026)  (0.078) (0.041) (0.029) 
TRADE(-1)  -0.173 -0.116 0.231  0.947*** 0.893*** 0.289*  -0.197 0.690*** 0.282* 
  (0.514) (0.311) (0.583)  (0.197) (0.123) (0.150)  (0.428) (0.209) (0.145) 
STOCK(-1)  0.181** 0.099* 0.035  0.036 0.059*** 0.015  0.111 0.009 0.005 
  (0.075) (0.054) (0.098)  (0.032) (0.018) (0.023)  (0.076) (0.037) (0.026) 
Observation  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064 
N   461 613 461  461 613 461  461 613 461 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is estimated by white robust covariance. The 
model is estimated in first differences with third lagged instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. 
All the variables are removed by trend and seasonality. I do not report the influences of second and third lagged output, employment and investment 
because of the space limitations. 
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Table 2.6 Results on firm-level variables: Liability 
  Output  Employment  Investment 
 
 High 
liability 
Medium 
liability 
Low liability 
 High 
liability 
Medium 
liability 
Low liability 
 High 
liability 
Medium 
liability 
Low 
liability 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.264*** 0.135* 0.062  0.002 0.039*** 0.012**  0.008** 0.015* 0.006 
  (0.072) (0.076) (0.057)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
EMP(-1)  0.123* 0.059 0.181*  0.808*** 0.842*** 0.844***  -0.170*** -0.153*** -0.128*** 
  (0.077) (0.054) (0.093)  (0.057) (0.028) (0.039)  (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) 
INVEST (-1)  0.006 0.004 0.009  0.012** 0.024*** 0.009*  0.341*** 0.355*** 0.334*** 
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) 
HEA(-1)  0.075*** 0.050*** 0.050***  0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005***  0.091*** 0.081*** 0.056*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOAN(-1)  0.358*** 0.225*** 0.112**  0.019 0.044*** 0.020*  0.758*** 0.589*** 0.455*** 
  (0.089) (0.052) (0.054)  (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.040) (0.030) (0.029) 
SPEN(-1)  0.507*** 0.366*** 0.277***  0.033 0.062*** 0.043  0.636*** 0.680*** 0.397*** 
  (0.106) (0.070) (0.101)  (0.026) (0.021) (0.026)  (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) 
TRADE(-1)  0.476 -0.507 0.331  0.769*** 0.661*** 0.706***  0.001 0.267 1.022*** 
  (0.571) (0.411) (0.423)  (0.172) (0.138) (0.146)  (0.323) (0.250) (0.239) 
STOCK(-1)  0.175* 0.068 0.054  0.056** 0.016 0.045*  0.044 0.034 0.033 
  (0.092) (0.060) (0.075)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)  (0.060) (0.045) (0.044) 
Observation  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064 
N   461 613 461  461 613 461  461 613 461 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is estimated by white robust covariance. The 
model is estimated in first differences with third lagged instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. 
All the variables are removed by trend and seasonality.  
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Table 2.7 Results on firm-level variables: Profitability 
  Output  Employment  Investment 
 
 
High 
profitability 
Medium 
profitability 
Low 
profitability 
 
High 
profitability 
Medium 
profitability 
Low 
profitabilit
y 
 High 
profitabi
lity 
Medium 
profitabi
lity 
Low 
profitabi
lity 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.175** 0.163*** 0.176***  0.019** 0.022*** 0.010  0.003 0.024*** 0.007* 
  (0.082) (0.026) (0.065)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) 
EMP(-1)  0.102* 0.030 0.222*  0.774*** 0.832*** 0.912***  -0.175*** -0.158*** -0.099*** 
  (0.060) (0.029) (0.126)  (0.055) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) 
INVEST (-1)  -0.001 -0.002 0.032  0.012*** 0.017*** 0.016**  0.331*** 0.340*** 0.379*** 
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.037)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) 
HEA(-1)  0.047*** 0.061*** 0.065***  0.016*** 0.009*** -0.005**  0.103*** 0.080*** 0.045*** 
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
LOAN(-1)  0.216*** 0.264*** 0.215***  0.027* 0.032*** 0.022**  0.785*** 0.609*** 0.399*** 
  (0.069) (0.035) (0.075)  (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)  (0.041) (0.030) (0.028) 
SPEN(-1)  0.213** 0.388*** 0.520***  0.046 0.064*** 0.020  0.710*** 0.579*** 0.448*** 
  (0.106) (0.050) (0.122)  (0.031) (0.019) (0.025)  (0.062) (0.048) (0.044) 
TRADE(-1)  -0.830 -0.076 1.063*  0.888*** 0.862*** 0.411***  0.812** 0.472* -0.0003 
  (0.591) (0.269) (0.576)  (0.183) (0.132) (0.156)  (0.332) (0.250) (0.229) 
STOCK(-1)  -0.149* 0.119** 0.295***  0.032 0.042** 0.038  0.060 0.045 0.010 
  (0.085) (0.048) (0.091)  (0.028) (0.019) (0.024)  (0.062) (0.045) (0.043) 
Observation  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064  11064 14712 11064 
N   461 613 461  461 613 461  461 613 461 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is estimated by white robust covariance. The 
model is estimated in first differences with third lagged instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. 
All the variables are removed by trend and seasonality.  
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Regarding the interaction with firm-level output, employment and investment, Table 
2.8 shows that these three firm indicators have the significant interaction, that is, firm 
employment and investment positively affect output and the increased output reversely 
promotes employment and investment growth. However, compared with the state-owned 
firms and private firms, I observe that the positive interaction of these three firm-level 
indicators is significantly larger for private firms. Specifically, firm employment has a 
larger effect on output for private firms than state-owned firms and firm investment has a 
significant effect on output only in private firms. This means that private firms have 
significant and higher investment efficiency in China (e.g., see Liu et al., 2018).  
The corresponding results are given in Table 2.8 where all of my variables have their 
positive effects on firm-level output, employment and investment. The influences of these 
variables are greatly different on the state-owned and private firms. Banking health ratio 
and credit supply have larger impacts on the output for private firms but have smaller 
impacts on the investment for state-owned firms. However, the effects of banking health 
ratio and credit supply on output of state-owned firms are smaller but their effects on 
investment of state-owned firms are large. It demonstrates that the credit constraints widely 
exist for private firms, which can not get enough finance for investment. On the other hand, 
it also shows that the investment efficiency for state-owned firms is low. Meanwhile, the 
results demonstrate that government expenditure also promotes more growth of output and 
employment for private firms but its impact on investment of private firms is less than 
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state-owned firms. Furthermore, net export has significant larger effects on the 
employment and investment of state-owned firms. US financial market performance has 
significant negative impacts on investment of state-owned firms. 
The results are in line with studies such as by Faccio et al. (2006), Poncet et al. (2010) 
and Chan et al. (2012). Their studies observe that private firms face the highest degree of 
financial constraints, whereas state-owned enterprises do not experience any financial 
constraints. Meanwhile, politically-connected firms are more likely to be bailed out when 
they face financial difficulties compared to similar but non-politically connected firms 
(Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2018). Jefferson (2016) 
also explains that the private firms are more profitable and efficient compared to 
state-owned firms in China because the state-own firms have the problems in corrupt 
practices, weak supervision and undefined property rights. 
In order to stimulate the economy and adjust industry structure, the Chinese 
government promulgated the “top ten industry revitalization plan” in the early 2009. The 
industries mainly cover manufacturing industries (automobile, equipment, shipbuilding 
manufacturing industry, non-ferrous metal industry, steel industry, textile industry, 
petrochemical industry), electronic information industries and logistics industries. The 
detailed measures include providing credit support, increasing tax rebates and government 
purchase on the products of the firms, such as agricultural products, refined oil and 
non-ferrous metal. 
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Table 2.8 Results on firm-level variables: Ownership 
  Output   Employment  Investment 
  State Private  State Private  State Private 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.123*** 0.185***  0.005 0.025***  0.036*** 0.010*** 
  (0.046) (0.068)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.003) 
EMP(-1)  0.064* 0.174*  0.810*** 0.850***  -0.153*** -0.111*** 
  (0.038) (0.092)  (0.043) (0.030)  (0.024) (0.020) 
INVEST (-1)  0.001 0.061*  0.016*** 0.030***  0.348*** 0.489*** 
  (0.010) (0.034)  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.016) 
HEA(-1)  0.046*** 0.052***  0.006*** 0.006***  0.058*** 0.039*** 
  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
LOAN(-1)  0.072*** 0.166***  0.016*** 0.017***  0.380*** 0.256*** 
  (0.024) (0.037)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.012) (0.011) 
SPEN(-1)  0.267*** 0.422***  0.020 0.070***  0.525*** 0.394*** 
  (0.056) (0.113)  (0.018) (0.027)  (0.044) (0.041) 
TRADE(-1)  0.200 1.621  0.965*** 0.538***  2.605*** 2.047*** 
  (0.345) (0.651)  (0.129) (0.178)  (0.265) (0.246) 
STOCK(-1)  0.083 0.040  0.045*** 0.003  -0.168*** -0.101*** 
  (0.051) (0.086)  (0.016) (0.025)  (0.043) (0.038) 
Observation  19728 13104  19728 13104  19728 13104 
N  822 546  822 546  822 546 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is 
estimated by white robust covariance. The model is estimated in first differences with third lagged 
instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014. All the 
variables are removed by trend and seasonality. I do not report the influences of second and third lagged 
output, employment and investment because of the space limitations. 
Since industries are supported differently due to government policies, I replicate my 
investigation based on the 13 industries given in Table 2.2. I find that some industries have 
the strong interaction with firm-level output, employment and investment. To be specific, 
firm investment or employment positively affect output, including Agriculture and 
Relevant Industry (ARI), Manufacturing Industry (MAN), Utility Industry (UTI) and Real 
Estate Industry (EST). On the other hand, the increased output reversely promotes the 
growth of employment or investment, including Manufacturing Industry (MAN), Financial 
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& Insurance Industry (FIN), Real Estate Industry (EST), Social Service Industry (SOC) 
and Communication & Culture Industry (COM). It means that the different industries have 
large heterogeneity in the interaction of three firm-level indicators.  
Regarding the effects of the banking health ratio and credit supply on firm-level 
output, employment and investment, I find that banking health ratio and credit supply have 
significant and positive impacts on the output in almost all the industries, expect Mining 
Industry (MIN), Information Technology Industry (INF) and Financial & Insurance 
Industry (FIN). Manufacturing Industry (MAN), Construction Industry (CON), 
Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA) and Real Estate Industry (EST) are larger 
positively affected by banking health ratio and credit supply. Banking health ratio and 
credit supply also have significant positive impacts on the employment of Manufacturing 
Industry (MAN) because Manufacturing Industry (MAN) has a large demand for labor 
with the increase of investment and output. In the case of investment, I observe that 
banking health ratio and credit supply have significant positive impacts on all the 
industries, where Manufacturing Industry (MAN), Utility Industry (UTI), Mining Industry 
(MIN), Construction Industry (CON) and Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA) 
receive larger financial support.  
Furthermore, I observe that the fiscal policy has larger significant impacts on the 
output of the industries, including Agriculture and Relevant Industry (ARI), 
Manufacturing Industry (MAN) and Real Estate Industry (EST). The larger impacts on the 
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employment lie in the Manufacturing Industry (MAN) and Social Service Industry (SOC). 
The larger impacts on the investment lie in the Manufacturing Industry (MAN), 
Agriculture and Relevant Industry (ARI), Utility Industry (UTI), Mining Industry (MIN), 
Construction Industry (CON) and Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA).  
Regarding the external economic shocks, net export has significant effects on the 
output in the Real Estate Industry (EST) and Communication & Culture Industry (COM). 
Net export has significant effects on the employment of Construction Industry (CON), 
Social Service Industry (SOC) and Communication & Culture Industry (COM). In the 
investment aspect, net export has significant effects on the investment of most industries, 
except for Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA) and Conglomerate Industry 
(CONG). The US financial market performance does not have significant influences on the 
output, employment and investment for these industries.  
In summary, among these industries, it is evident that the industries in need of 
financial support in the revitalization plan really obtain banking credit and government 
fiscal support, including Manufacturing Industry (MAN), Utility Industry (UTI) and 
Transportation & Warehousing Industry (TRA). However, besides these industries, some 
other problematic industries due to their potential impacts on boosting housing prices, 
especially Mining Industry (MIN), Construction Industry (CON) and Real Estate Industry 
(EST), have also received banking credit. Furthermore, some industries are exposed to 
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large external economic impacts, such as Agriculture and Relevant Industry (ARI) and 
Utility Industry (UTI). 
Since the positive roles of financial and fiscal policies might be different in the Great 
Recession (2008-2009) and recovery period (2010-2014) (e.g., see Campello et al, 2010, 
Lin et al, 2011, Corsetti et al., 2012; Ouyang and Peng, 2015), I investigate the effects of 
banking health ratio, credit supply and government expenditure considering the interaction 
with the Great Recession dummy. The regression models are shown as:  
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where 
tG  is the dummy variable ( 1G  ) for the Great Recession. It covers the fourth 
quarter in 2008 to the fourth quarter in 2009 since the GDP growth in this period declines 
sharply from 11% to 8%. 
Table 2.9 shows that firm-level output, employment and investment have the expected 
significant interaction, that is, firm employment and investment positively affect output 
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and the increased output reversely promotes growth of employment and investment 
growth. Besides, banking health ratio and credit supply have their expected positive 
impacts on the firm-level output, employment and investment. Besides, government 
expenditure and net export also have positive and significant effects on output, 
employment and investment. The US financial market performance has a positive impact 
on output and employment but its impact on investment is negative. Most results are very 
similar as the pervious findings. 
Regarding the interaction effects of banking health ratio, credit supply and 
government expenditure with Great Recession dummy, I observe that the interaction effect 
of banking health ratio with the Great Recession dummy is -0.073, suggesting that the 
influence of banking health ratio on the output is about 0.034 (0.107 minus 0.073). 
Furthermore, the interaction influence of banking health ratio on the employment and 
investment are 0.005 (0.011 plus 0.006) and 0.29 (0.146 minus 0.117), respectively. The 
results mean that the Great Recession hurts the positive effects of banking health ratio, 
which reflects the importance of quality of credit intermediation in the economic recession 
(see Bernanke, 1983). 
Regarding the interaction effect of credit supply and Great Recession dummy, I find 
the interaction effect is significant positive. To be specific, the influence of credit supply 
on the output is 0.236 (0.054 plus 0.182) in the Great Recession. The effects on the 
employment and investment are 0.050 (0.009 plus 0.041) and 0.547 (0.266 plus 0.281), 
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respectively. I also find that the interacting influences of government expenditure are very 
significant. The influences on the firm-level output, employment and investment are 0.899 
(0.324 plus 0.575), 0.040 (0.040 plus 0) and 0.016 (0.495 minus 0.479), respectively. The 
results are consistent with the findings of some papers.  For example, Corsetti et al. 
(2012) find that output multipliers of government expenditure are especially larger in 
times of financial crisis. Ouyang and Peng (2015) document the effect of 2008 economic 
stimulus plan temporarily affects only in the Great Recession period (around 2 years).  
Therefore, I acknowledge that credit supply and government expenditure have more 
of an impact in the Great Recession, which supports the success of the Chinese 
government’s “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” and the RMB 14.6 trillion growth of bank 
credit. However, the positive influences of banking health ratio diminish quickly after the 
Great Recession because of possible bad loan increase and credit oversupply. 
2.3.2 Dynamic analysis 
In order to expound on the dynamic nature of my empirical model, this section 
presents the impulse response functions and the variance decompositions from the panel 
VAR model. In particular, I investigate the dynamic effects of the interaction of firm-level 
variables and the shocks of banking health ratio, credit supply, government expenditure 
and external economic factors on firm-level variables. I explore their impulse reaction 
functions and variance decompositions individually.  
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Table 2.9 Results on the regression models with interaction effects 
  Output  Employment  Investment 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
OUTPUT(-1)  0.177*** 0.178*** 0.178***  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***  0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
EMP(-1)  0.119*** 0.118*** 0.119***  0.835*** 0.834*** 0.835***  -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.131*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
INVEST (-1)  0.014 0.015 0.018*  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***  0.381*** 0.382*** 0.384*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
HEA(-1)  0.107*** 0.054*** 0.051***  0.011*** 0.007*** 0.006***  0.146*** 0.061*** 0.049*** 
  (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
LOAN(-1)  0.086*** 0.070*** 0.091***  0.015*** 0.009** 0.016***  0.289*** 0.266*** 0.335*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
SPEN(-1)  0.441*** 0.335*** 0.324***  0.049*** 0.036*** 0.040***  0.607*** 0.437*** 0.495*** 
  (0.055) (0.053) (0.054)  (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
TRADE(-1)  1.057*** 0.968*** 0.605*  0.864*** 0.902*** 0.825***  3.092*** 2.927*** 2.444*** 
  (0.319) (0.317) (0.317)  (0.101) (0.102) (0.101)  (0.179) (0.175) (0.180) 
STOCK(-1)  0.159*** -0.066 0.129**  0.041*** 0.007 0.034**  0.076*** -0.279*** -0.213*** 
  (0.048) (0.044) (0.056)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.039) 
HEA(-1)CRISIS(-1)  -0.073***    -0.006**    -0.117***   
  (0.011)    (0.003)    (0.006)   
LOAN(-1)CRISIS(-1)   0.182***    0.041***    0.281***  
   (0.023)    (0.005)    (0.015)  
SPEN(-1) )CRISIS(-1)    0.575***    0.026    -0.479*** 
    (0.185)    (0.037)    (0.133) 
Observation  36840 36840 36840  36840 36840 36840  36840 36840 36840 
N  1535 1535 1535  1535 1535 1535  1535 1535 1535 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. The standard error is estimated by white robust covariance. The 
model is estimated in first differences with third lagged instruments. The sample covers all the 13 industries and the sample period is from 2008 to 2014.  
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Figure 2.3 shows that firm-level output, employment and investment positively 
respond to their lags. Furthermore, firm output responds positively to employment and 
investment. Firm employment responds positively to output but responds negatively to 
investment. Firm investment positively responds to output and employment. Among the 
results, I observe that the growth of firm output is 60%, 6% and 2.4% and diminishes after 
responding to the shocks of lagged output, employment and investment, respectively. 
Furthermore, the results show that firm-level output, employment and investment 
respond positively to banking health ratio, credit supply and government expenditure. To 
be specific, I observe that firm-level output, employment and investment increase 3.1%, 
0.6% and 1.0% in the highest point around the 3
rd
 period in the one unit standard deviation 
shock of banking health ratio. The output and investment converge to 0 around the 5
th
 
period. In the one unit standard deviation shock from credit supply, firm output and 
investment increase 4% and 90% in the highest point around the 3
rd
 period and converge to 
0 in the 5
th
 period, respectively. However, employment only increases 0.5% and converges 
to 0 around the 10
th
 period. Besides, in the one unit standard deviation shock of 
government expenditure, output and investment increase 1.5% and 28% in the highest 
point around the 3
rd
 period but the response of employment is very small.  
In summary, these results show that the shocks of banking indicators and government 
expenditure have a large effect on output and investment but their effects are significant in 
a very short period because Chinese government takes “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” 
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only in 2008 and 2009 and prevents too fast credit growth after 2009 (see Ouyang and 
Peng, 2015). Besides, I observe that the effects of bank credit and government expenditure 
on investment are much larger than output and employment. 
Furthermore, I observe that the responses of firm-level output, employment and 
investment to net export and US financial market performance are not very large. 
Specifically, in the one unit standard deviation shock of net export, firm-level output, 
employment and investment increase 1.5%, 1.5% and 6%, respectively. However, output 
and employment do not have significant responses for the one unit standard deviation 
shock of US financial market performance but the investment decreases 2.1%. 
Figure 2.3 Results of the impulse response functions 
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Note: I examine the interaction of firm output, employment and investment. Since I think the shocks of 
banking health ratio, credit supply, government expenditure, net trade and US financial market performance 
may have some correlations with each other, I examine their impulse reaction function one by one. The 
number of Monte Carlo is 1000.  
Furthermore, I apply variance decompositions to assess the importance of changes in 
one variable to explain the changes in other variable. As I investigate the interaction of 
three firm-level indicators and the shocks from banking health ratio, credit supply, 
government expenditure, net trade and US financial market performance one by one, Table 
2.10 shows that the changes of firm-level output are affected by the lagged output 
(90.66%), employment (7.78%) and investment (1.56%) and affected by the shock of 
government expenditure (4.26%) and credit supply (3.13%) in the 10
th
 period forecast 
horizon, respectively. For the responses of firm-level employment, the large influential 
variables refer to the lagged employment (95.58%), output (4.31%) and government 
expenditure (3.51%) in the 10
th
 period forecast horizon. The impact of other financial 
variables is small. For the responses of firm-level investment, I find that the lagged 
investment (96.00%), banking health ratio (14.94%), credit supply (8.21%) and 
government expenditure (6.99%) have large effects in the 10
th
 period forecast horizon. 
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In summary, I confirm that banking health ratio, credit supply and government 
expenditure have large and significant explanations for the change of firm output, 
employment and investment while credit supply and government expenditure are much 
more effective on firm investment than output and employment. However, Chinese 
government’s financial and fiscal policies cannot explain a lot since these polices are 
carried on only in 2008 and 2009. The US financial market performance also has a very 
little influence since this impact is indirect on the firm output, employment and 
investment. 
Since state-owned firms and private firms have a large difference in size, liability 
ratio and profitability, I divide the whole sample by ownership and apply impulse 
reaction functions and variance decompositions to investigate these two types of firms. 
Regarding the interaction with firm output, employment and investment, I observe that 
they have expected influences on each other in both types of firms. Compared with 
state-owned firms and private firms, I observe that the output of private firms have a 
larger response to employment but has a smaller response for investment. The 
state-owned firms have a larger response to investment but have a smaller response for 
employment. 
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Table 2.10 Results on the variance decompositions 
Response 
variable 
Forecast 
horizon 
Impulse variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OUTPUT 
 OUTPUT EMP INVEST HEA LOAN EXPE TRADE STOCK 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 99.35% 0.16% 0.49% 0.39% 0.38% 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 
4 97.96% 1.00% 1.04% 0.58% 2.12% 1.83% 0.11% 0.04% 
6 95.98% 2.64% 1.39% 0.52% 2.86% 3.14% 0.12% 0.07% 
8 93.52% 4.95% 1.52% 0.51% 3.05% 3.92% 0.13% 0.10% 
10 90.66% 7.78% 1.56% 0.51% 3.13% 4.26% 0.13% 0.12% 
EMP 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 0.83% 99.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.12% 0.01% 0.26% 
4 1.90% 98.00% 0.10% 0.08% 0.10% 1.45% 0.01% 0.29% 
6 2.81% 97.09% 0.10% 0.10% 0.07% 2.78% 0.01% 0.41% 
8 3.61% 96.28% 0.10% 0.14% 0.05% 3.31% 0.01% 0.43% 
10 4.31% 95.58% 0.11% 0.16% 0.04% 3.51% 0.01% 0.44% 
INVEST 
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 1.19% 0.12% 98.69% 7.08% 2.85% 0.13% 0.31% 0.04% 
4 2.13% 0.20% 97.68% 14.13% 8.16% 6.47% 0.83% 0.23% 
6 2.79% 0.28% 96.92% 14.62% 8.20% 7.29% 0.91% 0.28% 
8 3.18% 0.41% 96.41% 15.08% 8.20% 7.07% 0.97% 0.28% 
10 3.41% 0.59% 96.00% 14.94% 8.21% 6.99% 0.97% 0.29% 
Note: I obtain the variance decomposition in six models by considering the interaction of firm output, employment and investment and the shock one by 
one, including banking health ratio, credit supply, government expenditure, net trade and US financial market performance. The number of Monte Carlo is 
1000.  
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In the case of firm-level output, employment and investment response to banking 
health ratio, credit supply, government expenditure and external economic factors, I find 
that banking health ratio has the positive effects on the firm output and employment for 
both types of firms while it has much larger effects on the investment of state-owned 
firms. Credit supply has a larger and significant effect on the private firms in output and 
employment than state-owned firms but its role on investment is much larger for 
state-owned firms. Similarly, government expenditure has a significant larger effect on 
private firms in output and employment than state-owned firms but the investment of 
state-owned firms is more positively affected by government expenditure. Regarding the 
external economic factors, net export has larger effects on the investment of state-owned 
firms and the output of private firms. However, the output, employment and investment 
of both types of firms do not have significant responses for the shock of US financial 
market performance.  
In summary, in the dynamic analysis perspective, I can conclude that the shocks of 
banking indicators and government expenditure for both the state-owned firms and 
private firms have a significant effect on output and investment but converge in a very 
short period, which represents the temporary effect of the Chinese government “RMB 
4-trillion stimulus plan” and RMB 14.6 trillion of bank credit growth. Furthermore, the 
shocks of banking indicators and government expenditure for the investment of 
state-owned firms are much larger than private firms while the shocks for output and 
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employment for state-owned firms are smaller than private firms, which are consistent to 
the static results in the Panel VAR model and confirm the financial constraints for 
private firms and low investment efficiency for state-owned firms. 
Comparing the results of variance decompositions of state-owned firms with private 
firms, I find that the response of state-owned firms’ output for employment (2.93%) and 
investment (0.13%) is smaller than private firms but state-owned firm output’s response 
for bank credit (4.57%) and government expenditure (15.57%) is a little bit larger than 
private firms in the 10th period forecast horizon, respectively. The employment of 
state-owned firms is greatly affected by output (1.81%) and government expenditure 
(5.18%) but the employment of private firms is greatly affected by its output (9.74%) and 
government expenditure (3.95%). In the case of investment, the state-owned firms are 
more affected for output (9.04%), banking health ratio (13.74%), credit supply (11.80%) 
and government expenditure (32.37%) in the 10th period forecast horizon. The 
investment of private firms is affected by output (2.06%), banking health ratio (9.91%), 
credit supply (9.02%) and government expenditure (5.96%) in the 10th period forecast 
horizon. These results also show that private firms have larger financial constraints and 
the investment efficiency of state-owned firms is lower. 
  59 
2.4 Conclusions 
I have investigated the roles played by the Chinese government on the recovery of 
Chinese firms through its financial policy of "RMB 14.6 trillion of bank credit growth" 
and the fiscal policy of the “RMB 4-trillion stimulus plan” from the Great Recession to 
2014. My analysis explores the interaction of Chinese firm-level output, employment and 
investment and the effects of these policies on these three firm-level indicators. The results 
have presented that three firm-level indicators have strong interaction, that is, firm 
employment and investment positively affect output. The increased firm output reversely 
promotes the growth of employment and investment. I also observe that both credit supply 
and a healthy banking system contribute to the growth of firm-level output, employment 
and investment; fiscal policies through government expenditure have also been shown to 
be effective on the recovery based on the firm-level data. Among the three firm-level 
indicators, firm investment is stimulated greatly and grows extensively. Both of these 
results imply that the Chinese financial and fiscal policies have been successful for 
recovery in the Great Recession. The results also show that Chinese exports also have 
significant impacts on the Chinese economic recovery.  
Since Chinese firms might face the financial constrains faced by different government 
policies due to their size, liability, profitability, ownership and industry, I also investigate 
how the effects of the banking indicators and the government expenditure change with 
such firm characteristics. The results suggest that credit supply and a healthy banking 
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system are more effective on the investment of larger and state-owned firms, but the 
investment efficiency of larger and state-owned firms is lower than smaller and private 
firms. Indicators of banking credit, a healthy banking system and government expenditure 
are shown to be more impactful on the output and investment of high- and medium- 
liability firms. Furthermore, higher profitable firms receive more credit support compared 
to medium and low profitable firms. Finally, consistent with the “top ten industry 
revitalization plan” promulgated by the Chinese government in early 2009, certain 
industries have benefited more from financial and fiscal policies. By using impulse 
reaction functions and variance decompositions, I also observe that banking health ratio, 
credit supply, government expenditure and external economic factors have significant 
dynamic effects on the firm-level output, employment and investment but these variables 
are relevant only in the Great Recession (2008-2009).  
Despite the success of these Chinese financial and fiscal policies in the Great 
Recession, there are corresponding costs of the soaring banking credit growth and higher 
government expenditure. In particular, Chinese commercial banks have a large quantity of 
loan facing insolvency risk if the firms cannot repay their loan, because certain industries 
have serious problems of having overcapacity, low production efficiency and limited 
development potential. Moreover, the Chinese government has a major financial burden 
due to the financing of its policies through government debt. Such macroeconomic issues 
deserve further research in the future. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWH VOLATILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Growth volatility is an important concern for a government, who wants to employ the 
policies to reduce exogenous shocks and smooth aggregate fluctuations without 
aggravating the business cycle. However, the studies to explore the trend of growth 
volatility and its relationship with financial sector development in the global perspective 
are limited. Some scholars investigate the roles of financial sector development on the 
growth volatility and find financial sector development can smoothen investment, 
consumption, diversify portfolios, manage production risks, generate information about 
the risks and returns of investments and then decrease growth volatility (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; King and Levine, 1993, Obstfeld, 1994; Acemoglu and Ziliboti, 1997; 
Levine, 1997; Egert and Sutherland, 2014). Aghion et al. (1999), Caballero and 
Krishnamurty (2001) and Denizer et al. (2002) think that financial sector development can 
absorb economic shocks. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) document that market imperfections and restrictions can amplify macroeconomic 
shocks. Besides, Kunieda (2008), Beck et al. (2014), Wang et al. (2016) and Ibrahim and 
Alagidede (2017) point out that the impact of financial sector development on the growth 
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volatility is nonlinear because of the financial leverage effect on the investment. Bacchetta 
and Caminal (2000) and Aghion et al. (2004) argue that the ultimate positive or negative 
effects of financial sector development on the volatility attribute to real or monetary 
shocks and a country’s financial development level.  
Combining several strands of the literature above, I investigate the following issues in 
this paper. The first is to examine the difference of the country-level annual growth 
volatility and its trend from 1997 to 2014, which is different from the long-term growth 
volatility by using several-year panels (Ferreira da Silva, 2002; Beck et al., 2006; Mangelli 
and Popov, 2015). The second issue is to explore whether financial sector development 
reduces growth volatility and the third is to examine whether financial sector development 
magnifies or dampens the shock of inflation volatility on the growth volatility in its 
different development levels. In order to answer the questions above, I collect the data in 
the 50 countries and apply the dynamic panel threshold model to investigate the nonlinear 
role of financial sector development on the growth volatility, regarding the shock from 
inflation volatility. Furthermore, I use several bank credit and health indicators to proxy 
financial sector development in this paper.  
Overall, my empirical work shows that the aggregate growth volatility declines from 
1997 to 2014 globally while the growth volatility in the advanced countries is much 
smaller than the volatility in the emerging countries. Financial sector development in the 
lower regime would reduce growth volatility. Furthermore, I find that financial sector 
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development in the higher regime can magnify the shock of inflation volatility. Compared 
with the emerging countries, this magnifying effect of financial sector development is 
larger in the advanced countries. 
The majority of literature explores the important roles financial sector development 
has on economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; King and 
Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al., 2000). Pagano 
(1993), Hasan et al. (2009) and Koetter and Wedow (2010) argue that bank quality can 
also reflect financial sector development, besides bank credit indicators. However, the 
investigation of the relationship between financial sector development and growth 
volatility is comparatively limited.  
For the relationship between financial sector development and growth volatility, 
Levine (1997) finds that financial sector development could diminish growth volatility 
by diversifying portfolios, managing production risks, generating information about the 
risks and returns of alternative investments, which is helpful when allocating capital 
more efficiently. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), King and Levine (1993), Obstfeld 
(1994) and Acemoglu and Ziliboti (1997) think that the diversification not only 
encourages growth, but also reduces uncertainty since portfolio diversification can 
reduce aggregate risks. Furthermore, financial sector development would help to stabilize 
economic volatility by providing a broader scope of actions for monetary policy 
(Cecchetti and Krause, 2001), or allowing to smoothen consumption by relieving 
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household liquidity constraints (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2011). Denizer et al. (2002) point 
out that financial development leads to reductions in investment, consumption and output 
volatility. 
In some empirical papers, Easterly et al. (2001) find that financial sector 
development permits a better management of risks and determines the stability of the 
economy. Ferreira da Silva (2002) reveals the cross-country evidence that the countries 
with more developed financial systems have smoother economic fluctuations. Braun and 
Larrain (2005) use the cross-country industry data and find that financial development 
lowers output volatility, especially in the financially vulnerable sectors. Dynan et al. 
(2006) find that financial development could stabilize economic activity, such as 
consumer spending, housing investment, and business fixed investment. Mangelli and 
Popov (2015) find that financial development could reduce the aggregate volatility in the 
OECD countries. Fernández et al. (2016) point out that banking stability could reduce the 
volatility of the value added of industries by using 110 countries’ data.  
Regarding whether financial sector development magnifies or dampens the economic 
shocks, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) find that 
macroeconomic shocks are magnified by credit market imperfections because 
information asymmetries and agency costs could reduce the borrower’s ability to obtain 
credit so that business cycles exacerbates. Furthermore, they point out that the well 
developed financial system can dampen output volatility by removing or alleviating 
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financial constraints. Similarly, Aghion et al. (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001) 
and Denizer et al. (2002) find that the countries with well developed financial sector 
experience smaller output fluctuations since the developed financial sector can 
strengthen the economy's capacity to absorb shocks and then reduce cyclical fluctuations. 
Aghion et al. (2009) argue that financial market might be less effective to absorb the 
aggregate shocks and result in the higher growth volatility because of the various market 
imperfections and restrictions. Beck et al. (2006) conclude that financial intermediaries 
magnify the impacts of inflation volatility in the countries where firms have little or no 
access to external finance through the capital markets.  
However, more access to the financial market might allow enterprises to increase 
financial leverage with higher risks, which might lead to the nonlinear relationship 
between financial sector development and volatility. Kunieda (2008) finds that the effect 
of financial sector development on volatility is concave. Output volatility is lower in the 
low financial development level, increases in the middle development level and then 
becomes lower again in the high financial development level. Arcand et al. (2012) and 
Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) show that the relationship between financial 
development and volatility is U-shaped. They think that financial development acts as a 
shock absorber against volatility up to a point. Beyond this point, financial development 
might exacerbate shocks and increase volatility. In addition, Beck et al. (2014) use 77 
countries’ data in 1980–2007 and find that a developed financial sector stimulates growth 
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at the cost of higher volatility in the high-income countries. Wang et al. (2016) find that 
financial development tends to have significantly lower aggregate volatility but the 
magnitude of volatility reduction diminishes quickly as the financial market develops 
further. The reason is that financial development relaxes collateral constraints and 
improves credit-allocation efficiency across firms. Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017) employ 
the 23 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2014 and confirm that the 
well developed financial sector dampens business cycle volatility while unbridled 
financial development may also magnify fluctuations. 
Regarding whether financial sector development magnifies or dampens the effect of 
shocks on growth volatility, Bacchetta and Caminal (2000), Aghion et al. (2004) show 
that the ultimate positive or negative effects of financial development on the volatility 
depend on real or monetary shocks and a country's financial development level. Ferrante 
(2015) thinks the higher aggregate leverage of the banking system will amplify negative 
exogenous shocks through a mechanism, like the financial accelerator (see Bernanke et 
al., 1999; Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017) further show that the 
monetary shocks have a large magnifying effect on the volatility in the long-run business 
cycle but the reverse holds for the real shocks.  
Reviewing the literature above, I find that there are limited empirical studies to 
investigate the nonlinear relationship with financial sector development and growth 
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volatility and explore whether financial sector development could magnify or dampen 
the economic shocks in the global perspective. I believe my paper can fill this void. 
3.2 Empirical methodology and data 
3.2.1 Regression models 
Kremer et al. (2013) propose the dynamic panel threshold model by extending the 
static panel threshold estimation (Hansen, 1999) and the cross-sectional threshold model 
with instrument variables (Caner and Hansen, 2004), where the generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) are used to handle endogeneity. Regarding the dynamic patterns of 
growth volatility, in this paper, I apply the dynamic panel threshold model to investigate 
two issues. The first is to explore whether financial sector development has the nonlinear 
effect on the growth volatility and the second is to examine whether financial sector 
development magnifies or damps the shock from inflation volatility. The two model 
specifications shown as:  
1 1 2 1 3
4 5 6 7 8
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) (3.1)
it it it it it it it
it it it it it i it
SD GROWTH SD GROWTH FD I FD I FD FD I FD
SD INFLATION GDP TRADE GOV RECE
      
      
        
      
1 1 2 3 1
4 5 6 7 8
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (3.2)
it it it it it it
it it it it it it i it
SD GROWTH SD GROWTH FD SD INFLATION I FD I FD
SD INFLATION I FD GDP TRADE GOV RECE
     
       
      
        
where SD(GROWTH) means growth volatility, defined as the standard deviation of real 
industrial production growth in constant 2010 US$, SD(INFLATION) means inflation 
volatility, defined as the standard deviation of CPI. FD refers to financial sector 
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development. In this paper, I both use size and quality of bank credit to measure financial 
sector development. Four proxies for financial sector development include private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP (private credit), bank credit to bank deposits (credit 
allocation), domestic credit to private sector of GDP (domestic credit) and banking health 
ratio (bank health)
16
.  
In the control variables, GDP refers to log real gross domestic product in constant 
2010 US$ (economy size), TRADE refers to export and import as share of GDP (trade 
openness), GOV is government expenditure as share of GDP (government size) and RECE 
refer to the recession dummy
17
. i  is the country-specific fixed effect and it  is the 
error term. i  and t  denote the  index of country and time, respectively. The 
descriptions of the variables are shown in Table 3.1 
In the regression models, financial sector development (FD) is the threshold variable 
used to split the sample into two regimes and   is the unknown threshold parameter. 
( )I   is the indicator function, which takes the value 1 if the argument in parenthesis is 
valid, and 0 otherwise. This modelling strategy allows the roles of finance sector 
development to change in line with whether FD is below or above some unknown level 
of  . 
                                                          
16 I also use liquid liabilities to GDP to proxy financial sector development but I find it is not 
significant to affect growth volatility.  
17 The recession dummy indicates whether a country experiences the recession. I think that a 
recession occurs when cyclical output growth is more than one standard deviation below zero. After using 
the Hodrick–Prescott filter to remove the trend, I can obtain cyclical output growth. The smoothing 
parameter is 6.25. 
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Following Caner and Hansen (2004), there are three steps to estimate the 
specification coefficients. First, a reduced form regression is estimated for the 
endogenous variable, 2itX , as a function of the instruments, itZ  by the ordinary least 
square (OLS) and then obtain the fitted values of 
2
ˆ
itX . In this paper, I think the first 
lagged growth volatility is endogenous and I use more lagged growth volatility to become 
its instrument variables (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Following Roodman (2009), I only 
apply the second lagged growth volatility to be the instrument variable to avoid the 
overfitting problem. 
Second, by substituting the predicted values of 
2
ˆ
itX  into the equation, the threshold 
parameter   can be estimated by the OLS and I donate the resulting sum of squared 
residuals by ( )S  . In the end, the estimator of the threshold value   is selected as the 
one associated with the smallest sum of squared residuals, ˆ arg min ( )nS  .  
In line with Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004), the critical value to 
determine the 95% confidence interval of the threshold value is given by  
 : ( ) ( )LR C      
where ( )C   is the 95% of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic 
( )LR  . The underlying likelihood ratio is adjusted to account for the number of time 
periods used for each cross section (Hansen, 1999). Once the threshold value ( ˆ ) is 
determined, the coefficients can be estimated by using the generalized methods of 
moments (GMM).  
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Table 3.1 Variables and their meanings 
Variables Meanings 
Growth volatility Standard deviation of monthly real industrial production growth 
Inflation volatility Standard deviation of monthly CPI 
Financial sector development 
(Size) 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (Private credit) 
Bank credit to bank deposits (Credit allocation) 
Domestic credit to private sector of GDP (Domestic credit) 
Financial sector development 
(Quality) 
Bank return on equity (before tax) (Profitability) 
Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (Capital adequacy 
ratio) 
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (Bad loan ratio) 
Bank Z-score 
Economy size  Log real gross domestic product 
Government size Government expenditure/GDP 
Trade openness Export and import/GDP 
Recession dummy 
The dummy equals to 1 when output growth is more than one 
standard deviation below zero 
3.2.2 Data 
I collect the data from Global Economic Monitor (GEM), Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD), World Development Indicators (WDI) and Datastream. 
The sample includes 50 countries and the sample period is from 1997 to 2014
18
. To be 
specific, I collect monthly seasonal adjusted real industrial production in constant 2010 
US$ and seasonal adjusted CPI from Global Economic Monitor database and collect 
monthly seasonal adjusted PPI from Datastream. I use the standard deviation of monthly 
real industrial production growth, CPI and PPI to represent annual growth volatility and 
inflation volatility without overlapping, respectively. This is different from the long-term 
                                                          
18 In order to keep the whole sample balanced, the starting year I select is 1997 and the sample does 
not include some advanced countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada and United Kindom.  
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growth volatility using the several-year panels (Ferreira da Silva, 2002; Beck et al., 2006; 
Mangelli and Popov, 2015). I also collect the annual financial sector development proxies 
from Global Financial Development Database, including private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP, bank credit to bank deposits, domestic credit to private sector of GDP and 
banking health indicators. 
Specifically, the banking health indicators include bank return on equity (before tax) 
(profitability), bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (capital adequacy ratio), 
bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (bad loan ratio) and bank Z-score. Bank Z-score 
explicitly compares buffers (capitalization and returns) with risk (volatility of returns) to 
measure bank’s solvency risk. It has a significant negative relationship with the 
probability of a financial institution’s insolvency. The regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets and nonperforming loans to total gross loans measure the financial soundness. 
Therefore, I use the capital adequacy ratio, bad loan ratio and bank Z-score (financial 
stability proxies) and profitability to construct the banking health ratio
19
. I think that 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, bank credit to bank deposits and domestic 
credit to private sector of GDP can reflect the size of the financial sector development 
while the banking health ratio reflects the quality of the financial sector development.  
I also collect the annual control variables from World Development Indicators 
database, including real gross domestic product (constant 2010 US$) (economy size), 
                                                          
19 The component coefficients of the banking health ratio are 0.672 (profitability), -0.281 (capital 
adequacy ratio), -0.801 (bad loan ratio) and 0.518 (Z-score), respectively.  
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export and import/GDP (trade openness) and general government final consumption 
expenditure/GDP (government size). The descriptive statistics could be found in Table 
3.2. 
Table 3.2 shows that Denmark (1.45) has the largest private credit, followed by 
Iceland (1.38) and Japan (1.260) while Armenia (0.16), Gabon (0.10) and Venezuela 
(0.14) have the smaller private credit. Japan (1.92) has the largest domestic credit, 
followed by United States (1.805) and Denmark (1.46). Armenia (0.18), Gabon (0.11) and 
Venezuela (0.17) have the smaller domestic credit. Furthermore, China (2.73) has the 
largest credit allocation, followed by Denmark (2.71) and Sweden (2.21). Japan (0.61), 
Venezuela (0.69) and Philippines (0.35) have the smaller credit allocation. Regarding 
banking health, it is evident that the advanced countries have the healthier banking sectors 
than the developing countries. The bank Z-score shows that Austria (23.87), Israel (24.41) 
and United States (23.66) have more stable banking sectors. However, Ecuador (0.66), 
Indonesia (1.92) and Thailand (2.04) perform poorly in the banking stability
20
.  
In the control variables, the United States (14033.00) has the larger economy size 
followed by Japan (5338.91) and China (4333.82) while the economy size of Malta (7.99), 
Armenia (7.55) and Macedonia (8.11) is smaller. Singapore (3.74), Ireland (1.68) and 
Malaysia (1.85) have the larger trade openness but the trade openness in Japan (0.27), the 
                                                          
20 The banking sectors’ specific performances include profitability, capital adequacy ratio and bad 
loan ratio. The details can be found in Table 2. 
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United States (0.26) and Bangladesh (0.36) is smaller. Furthermore, government size in 
Denmark (0.25), Sweden (0.25) and Israel (0.24) is larger. However, Bangladesh (0.05), 
Indonesia (0.08) and Philippines (0.11) have smaller government size. Singapore (4.00) 
and Venezuela (4.00) experience the longer recession periods but most western European 
countries experience the shorter recession periods, such as Austria (1.00), France (1.00) 
and Germany (1.00).   
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Figure 3.1 The trend of aggregate growth volatility from 1997 to 2014 
Note: I calculate the country-level growth volatility by using 50 countries data year by year from 1997 to 
2014 and then calculate the weighted average growth volatility to obtain the aggregate growth volatility 
for the advanced, emerging countries and all the countries, respectively. The weight is the real industrial 
production in constant 2010 US$. The two shaded parts show the Asian financial crisis and 2008 global 
financial crisis, respectively.  
  74 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics in the 50 countries 
 
VOLAT
ILITY 
INFLAIT
ON 
PRIV
ATE 
CRED
EP 
DOME
SSTIC 
HEALT
H 
PROF CAPT BAD 
ZSCO
RE 
SIZE 
TRA
DE 
GO
V 
REC
E 
Developed countries 
Austria 0.016 0.002 0.93 1.29 0.94 0.78 7.38 14.22 2.61 23.87 366.47 0.93 0.19 1.00 
Belgium 0.023 0.002 0.62 0.71 0.64 0.19 12.20 14.57 2.79 8.32 449.27 1.44 0.22 2.00 
Czech 0.024 0.003 0.44 0.77 0.43 -0.39 14.85 14.02 8.60 3.69 182.61 1.17 0.20 2.00 
Denmark 0.037 0.002 1.45 2.71 1.46 0.31 11.27 14.47 2.23 9.83 311.31 0.89 0.25 1.00 
Estonia 0.032 0.003 0.59 1.51 0.18 0.19 14.50 17.73 1.75 8.23 18.48 1.42 0.19 3.00 
Finland 0.018 0.002 0.70 1.29 0.71 0.53 13.55 14.56 0.55 11.56 231.22 0.75 0.22 1.00 
France 0.014 0.002 0.85 1.25 0.86 0.19 8.10 12.38 4.25 11.82 2515.08 0.54 0.23 1.00 
Germany 0.014 0.002 1.01 1.46 1.00 0.27 5.67 13.98 3.77 15.31 3290.69 0.70 0.19 1.00 
Greece 0.030 0.003 0.73 0.90 0.76 -0.90 0.92 12.10 12.29 3.50 277.62 0.54 0.20 3.00 
Iceland 0.033 0.003 1.38 2.14 1.44 -0.27 16.47 15.32 4.98 -0.77 12.12 0.83 0.24 3.00 
Ireland 0.057 0.002 1.09 1.31 1.12 -0.05 -0.12 14.13 6.80 4.12 199.01 1.68 0.17 2.00 
Israel 0.023 0.004 0.76 1.00 0.71 1.00 13.48 11.64 3.57 24.41 201.12 0.70 0.24 3.00 
Italy 0.012 0.001 0.74 1.24 0.76 -0.14 6.67 11.55 9.32 12.81 2093.99 0.51 0.19 2.00 
Japan 0.018 0.007 1.26 0.61 1.92 -0.02 -0.03 12.29 3.62 10.72 5338.91 0.27 0.19 2.00 
Malta 0.035 0.004 1.06 0.84 1.38 0.12 15.36 15.37 7.48 15.56 7.99 2.58 0.19 3.00 
Netherlands 0.025 0.002 1.14 1.29 1.14 0.28 6.56 12.94 2.51 11.89 784.34 1.29 0.23 2.00 
Portugal 0.037 0.002 1.26 1.54 1.29 0.11 4.89 10.81 4.66 10.62 226.00 0.68 0.20 3.00 
Singapore 0.069 0.003 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.62 13.35 17.01 3.30 21.09 185.66 3.74 0.10 4.00 
Slovakia 0.042 0.004 0.42 0.85 0.37 -0.30 8.58 14.95 8.29 11.16 74.50 1.44 0.19 2.00 
Slovenia 0.025 0.004 0.54 1.12 0.55 -0.39 7.57 12.53 7.17 3.73 43.13 1.19 0.19 1.00 
South 
Korea 
0.022 0.003 0.84 1.35 1.15 0.10 9.40 12.45 2.45 6.97 916.28 0.81 0.13 1.00 
Spain 0.013 0.002 1.26 1.52 0.23 0.43 9.48 12.17 3.19 13.87 1300.63 0.56 0.18 2.00 
Sweden 0.036 0.002 0.93 2.21 0.96 0.66 22.88 11.29 1.11 6.59 446.30 0.83 0.25 1.00 
US  0.006 0.002 0.51 0.74 1.81 1.12 16.34 13.36 2.03 23.66 14033.0
0 
0.26 0.15 2.00 
Developing countries 
Armenia 0.061 0.009 0.16 1.25 0.18 -0.26 18.24 25.64 5.40 9.64 7.55 0.71 0.11 1.00 
Bangladesh 0.044 0.006 0.30 0.78 0.31 -1.00 13.88 8.45 22.67 2.91 94.05 0.36 0.05 2.00 
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Bolivia 0.042 0.005 0.43 1.00 0.48 -0.01 11.47 13.37 7.52 10.59 16.98 0.65 0.15 2.00 
Bulgaria 0.026 0.027 0.41 0.87 0.41 -0.98 15.24 22.06 9.23 4.54 43.32 1.01 0.18 2.00 
Chile 0.019 0.003 0.63 1.42 0.83 0.52 20.24 13.31 1.69 7.78 189.66 0.66 0.12 2.00 
China 0.007 0.003 1.10 2.73 1.18 0.65 19.49 7.333 
10.50
9 
9.53 20.11 4333.82 0.48 0.14 2.00 
Colombia 0.036 0.002 0.29 1.52 0.36 -0.12 12.65 14.95 5.54 6.24 247.99 0.36 0.17 2.00 
Ecuador 0.030 0.007 0.23 1.10 0.23 -0.57 13.20 15.87 8.50 -0.66 61.35 0.55 0.12 2.00 
Gabon 0.056 0.008 0.10 0.71 0.11 0.26 23.20 18.36 9.09 10.67 14.02 0.89 0.14 3.00 
Hungary 0.024 0.003 0.44 1.01 0.43 -0.11 16.48 13.74 6.68 4.88 122.98 1.40 0.21 2.00 
India 0.017 0.006 0.36 0.69 0.39 0.29 22.89 12.58 6.62 8.93 1260.28 0.40 0.11 3.00 
Indonesia 0.059 0.007 0.27 0.71 0.30 -1.48 6.39 19.05 12.79 1.92 626.40 0.58 0.08 1.00 
Latvia 0.023 0.003 0.48 1.57 0.62 -0.25 13.27 14.07 5.41 2.29 22.48 0.98 0.19 1.00 
Macedonia 0.055 0.006 0.30 1.12 0.31 -1.37 8.57 20.21 15.75 7.28 8.11 0.93 0.19 3.00 
Malaysia 0.026 0.003 1.15 1.01 1.21 -0.03 14.40 14.79 9.07 13.48 215.27 1.85 0.12 3.00 
Mexico 0.008 0.002 0.17 0.71 0.21 0.51 10.63 15.29 3.80 19.44 974.23 0.56 0.11 2.00 
Lithuania 0.060 0.003 0.32 1.14 0.27 -0.71 8.93 14.92 9.67 3.50 33.72 1.17 0.20 2.00 
Peru 0.033 0.002 0.23 0.89 0.25 0.62 23.27 12.97 5.70 14.26 119.27 0.45 0.11 3.00 
Philippines 0.044 0.003 0.32 0.65 0.35 0.00 10.95 16.81 9.87 18.65 167.39 0.87 0.11 2.00 
Poland 0.021 0.002 0.35 0.86 0.34 -0.32 12.87 13.58 9.49 7.20 404.45 0.73 0.18 3.00 
Russia 0.019 0.010 0.28 1.04 0.31 -0.14 17.05 16.51 6.64 7.05 1287.99 0.55 0.18 2.00 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.022 0.002 0.32 1.57 0.34 0.21 18.00 19.09 4.55 12.62 438.15 0.77 0.23 3.00 
Thailand 0.042 0.004 1.09 1.09 1.17 -1.13 6.39 13.95 11.91 2.04 287.78 1.24 0.14 3.00 
Tunisia 0.033 0.002 0.58 1.26 0.64 -0.45 11.10 11.17 18.31 17.20 36.52 0.78 0.17 2.00 
Venezuela 0.070 0.007 0.14 0.69 0.17 0.69 30.46 15.99 3.65 9.78 348.61 0.50 0.13 4.00 
South 
Africa 
0.022 0.003 0.68 1.22 1.37 1.01 20.03 13.37 3.41 21.19 328.47 0.57 0.19 2.00 
Note: VOLATILITY = Growth volatility, INFLAITON= Inflation volatility, PRIVATE = Private credit, CREDEP = Credit allocation, DOMESTIC = 
Domestic credit, HEALTH = Banking health, PROF = Profitability, CAPT = Capital adequacy ratio, BAD = Bad loan ratio, ZSCORE = Bank Z-score, 
SIZE = Economy size, TRADE = Trade openness, GOV = Government size, RECE = Recession dummy (the number of recession periods in one country). 
The unit of real GDP (constant 2010 US$) is billion. 
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Figure 3.2 The country-level growth volatility of the 50 countries 
Note: I calculate the average country-level growth volatility from 1997 to 2014 for each sample country 
Figure 3.1 shows the trend of aggregate growth volatility of advanced, emerging and 
all the countries from 1997 to 2014. I observe that the aggregate growth volatility of all 
the countries declines from 1997 to 2014 but the aggregate growth volatility jumps up in 
the South American Economic Crisis (2002-2003), the Global Financial Crisis 
(2007-2009) and the European Debt Crisis (2010-2012). After dividing 50 countries into 
the advanced and emerging countries in line with World Economic Outlook (2013), I 
observe that the growth volatility of the emerging countries is much more fluctuating and 
larger than the advanced countries
21
. I argue that one of the reasons is that the 
poorly-developed financial sectors might exacerbate volatility because of the fewer 
                                                          
21 Latvia starts to be regarded as the advanced country in World Economic Outlook (2014). I put 
Latvia in the emerging country group in line with World Economic Outlook (2013) since Latvia is thought 
as an emerging country in a long term.  
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opportunities for firms to smooth investment shocks (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
2001). 
Furthermore, Figure 3.2 shows the country-level growth volatility of the 50 
countries, where most emerging countries have larger growth volatility than advanced 
countries. To be specific, Venezuela (0.070), Singapore (0.069) and Armenia (0.061) 
have larger growth volatility. The United States (0.006), Mexico (0.008), China (0.007) 
and most western European countries have smaller growth volatility, like France (0.014), 
Italy (0.012), Spain (0.013) and Germany (0.014).  
Table 3.3 shows the correlations of the variables used in this paper. It is evident that 
inflation volatility has a positive relationship with growth volatility. All the banking credit 
and health indicators are negatively related with growth volatility, including private credit, 
credit allocation, domestic credit and banking health. It demonstrates that financial sector 
development could diminish growth volatility. In the control variables, economy size and 
government size have negative relationships with growth volatility and trade openness 
positively affects growth volatility. Growth volatility becomes greater in the recession 
periods because of the positive relationship with recession dummy and growth volatility. 
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Table 3.3 The correlations of the variables 
 VOLATILITY INFLATION PRVIATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH SIZE TRADE GOV RECE 
VOLATILITY 1.000          
INFLATION 0.106 1.000         
PRVIATE -0.177 -0.100 1.000        
CREDEP -0.177 -0.067 0.571 1.000       
DOMESTIC -0.229 -0.097 0.856 0.411 1.000      
HEALTH -0.218 -0.177 0.038 0.037 0.149 1.000     
SIZE -0.372 -0.087 0.254 0.030 0.394 0.257 1.000    
TRADE 0.234 -0.027 0.250 -0.052 0.115 0.002 -0.315 1.000   
GOV -0.196 -0.104 0.364 0.321 0.272 0.075 0.035 0.026 1.000  
RECE 0.092 0.037 0.072 0.014 0.032 -0.103 -0.032 0.017 0.030 1.000 
Note: VOLATILITY = Growth volatility, INFLATION = Inflation volatility, PRIVATE = Private credit, CREDEP = Credit allocation, DOMESTIC = 
Domestic credit, HEALTH = Banking health, SIZE = Economy size, TRADE = Trade openness, GOV = Government size, RECE = Recession dummy 
(the number of recession periods in one country). 
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3.3 Empirical results 
3.3.1 The roles of financial sector development on the growth volatility 
Table 3.4 demonstrates that growth volatility has a significant positive first lagged 
autocorrelation, which means growth volatility has dynamic features. Furthermore, 
financial sector development has a significant negative effect on the growth volatility in 
this lower regime when I use credit allocation, domestic credit and banking health 
proxies. However, most bank credit and health indicators are not significant in the higher 
regime, except banking health. It shows that high financial sector development measured 
by bank credit size can not reduce growth volatility since the financial constraints for 
firms decrease and firms could increase financial leverage with higher risks. However, 
high financial sector development measured by banking health (quality variable) could 
reduce growth volatility without the threshold constraint. The threshold points for credit 
allocation, domestic credit and banking health are 0.601, 1.307 and 0.621, respectively. 
The results support the nonlinear relationship with financial sector development and 
growth volatility (Kunieda, 2008; Beck et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2016; Ibrahim and 
Alagidede, 2017).  
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Table 3.4 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.369*** 0.363*** 0.413*** 0.447*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) 
FD in the lower regime 0.101 -0.042*** -0.011* -0.002** 
 (0.116) (0.012) (0.006) (0.001) 
FD in the higher regime -0.007 -0.004 0.009 -0.008*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Inflation volatility 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.134*** 0.118*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Economy size 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government size 0.039 0.033 0.075* 0.055 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
Recession dummy 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.003 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.010*** 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) 
Threshold point 0.193 0.601 1.307 0.621 
Confidence interval  0.189-0.197 0.590-0.992 0.122-1.388 -1.608-0.846 
Observations 900 900 900 900 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The results are obtained by estimating Eq. (3.1). 
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Table 3.5 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models in the advanced and emerging countries 
 Advanced countries Emerging countries 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.676*** 0.654*** 0.657*** 0.883*** 0.193** 0.187** 0.229*** 0.252*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.096) (0.083) (0.089) (0.081) (0.081) 
FD in the lower regime -0.218*** -0.043*** 0.056 -0.006*** 0.095 -0.151** -0.106* -0.003*** 
 (0.070) (0.013) (0.038) (0.002) (0.115) (0.059) (0.055) (0.001) 
FD in the higher regime -0.006 -0.010* -0.003 -0.002 0.008 -0.0002 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
Inflation volatility 0.863* 0.919* 0.748 0.322 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.087*** 0.102*** 
 (0.492) (0.521) (0.503) (0.510) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020) 
Economy size 0.021** 0.015* 0.017* 0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Trade openness 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Government size 0.028 0.006 0.026 0.015 0.004 0.035 0.013 0.034 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.065) (0.069) (0.066) (0.069) 
Recession dummy 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.083*** 0.020* 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.094*** 0.024* -0.009** 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.019) (0.036) (0.013) (0.004) 
Threshold point 0.426 0.795 0.364 0.411 0.193 0.680 0.281 -0.023 
Confidence interval 0.357-0.529 0.571-1.181 0.352-0.379 -1.255-0.866 0.189-0.211 0.609-0.946 0.110-0.407 -1.938-0.721 
Observations 432 432 432 432 468 0.187 468 468 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. Results are obtained by 
estimating Eq. (3.1). 
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Regarding the shock from inflation volatility, it is evident that inflation volatility 
significantly increases growth volatility, which is consistent with the findings from Beck 
et al. (2006) and Ibrahim and Alagidede (2017). In the control variables, trade openness 
significantly increases growth volatility. It shows that the countries with larger trade 
openness have more interactions with other countries so that they are easily influenced by 
the external shocks (Easterly et al., 2001; Kose et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2012). I 
observe that government size is positively related with growth volatility since government 
intervention could be procyclical and magnify business cycles (Lane, 2003; Alesina et al., 
2008). However, economy size and the recession dummy are not significant. 
Regarding the large differences of the advanced and emerging countries, I split the 
whole sample into two sub-samples. Table 3.5 shows that the advanced and emerging 
countries have a significant positive first lagged autocorrelation in the growth volatility. 
The autocorrelation of growth volatility in the advanced countries is larger than emerging 
countries. Bank credit and health indicators negatively affect growth volatility in the both 
groups of countries in the lower regime. To be specific, private credit, credit allocation 
and banking health work well in the advanced countries while the credit allocation, 
domestic credit and banking health are significant in the emerging countries. Compared 
with the emerging countries, financial sector development in the advanced countries 
reduces growth volatility more. In addition, the threshold points in the advanced 
countries are higher than the emerging countries. It shows that it is easier for the emerging 
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countries to reduce financial constraints and then diminish growth volatility. Furthermore, 
I observe that inflation volatility in the advanced countries has a large significant impact 
than emerging ones. Growth volatility is significantly influenced by trade openness in the 
advanced countries since the advanced countries have much larger trade openness than the 
emerging countries. Besides, economy size can significantly increase growth volatility in 
the advanced countries. Government size and the recession dummy are not significant for 
the advanced and emerging countries. 
3.3.2 The roles of financial sector development with the inflation volatility shock 
Regarding whether financial sector development might magnify or dampen economic 
shocks (Aghion et al., 1999; Caballero and Krishnamurty, 2001; Denizer et al., 2002; 
Aghion et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2017), I run the regression 
models again with the inflation volatility shock. I investigate inflation volatility because 
inflation volatility can comprehensively reflect the effects of monetary policy and external 
nominal shocks, such as foreign exchange rate and oil price shocks. Table 3.6 shows that 
growth volatility has a significant positive first lagged autocorrelation pattern. Financial 
sector development has an expected significant negative effect on growth volatility, 
including credit allocation and banking health indicators.  
Regarding the interaction effects of the inflation volatility with financial sector 
development, I observe that the interaction effects are significant positive for the growth 
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volatility in the two regimes but the effects in the higher regime are significantly larger 
than the effects in the lower regime. Specifically, the coefficient of inflation volatility 
interacted with private credit in the lower regime is not significant but the coefficient is 
0.142 in the higher regime. The coefficient of inflation volatility interacted with credit 
allocation is 0.118 in the lower regime while this coefficient is 1.390 in the higher 
regime. The coefficient of inflation volatility interacted with domestic credit is 0.121 in 
the lower regime while this coefficient is 0.574 in the higher regime. The coefficient of 
inflation volatility interacted with banking health is 0.101 in the lower regime and this 
coefficient is 1.086 in the higher regime. These findings support the conclusions from 
Arcand et al. (2012) and Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013). They find that financial 
development might absorb shocks against growth volatility up to a point. Beyond this 
point, financial development might exacerbate shocks and increase growth volatility. Beck 
et al. (2006) also argue that the excessive financial development can magnify the shock of 
inflation volatility on the growth volatility. Regarding the control variables, trade 
openness can increase growth volatility but economy size, government size and the 
recession dummy are not very significant.  
Similarly, I divide the whole sample into two sub-samples in line with the advanced 
and emerging countries. Table 3.7 presents that growth volatility has a significant 
positive first lagged autocorrelation pattern in both countries but the positive 
autocorrelation is larger in the advanced countries. Financial sector development has a 
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significant negative influence on the growth volatility in the both countries and its effect 
is more significant in the advanced countries. Specifically, credit allocation and banking 
health significantly reduce growth volatility in the advanced countries while only banking 
health works well to reduce growth volatility in the emerging countries. 
Table 3.6 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models with interaction effects 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.355*** 0.373*** 0.408*** 0.454*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) 
FD -0.007 -0.013*** -0.002 -0.003*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD in the 
lower regime)  
0.099 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.101*** 
 (0.179) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD in the 
higher regime) 
0.142*** 1.390*** 0.574** 1.086* 
 (0.018) (0.429) (0.292) (0.576) 
Economy size 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trade openness 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government size 0.038 0.058 0.050 0.046 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Recession dummy 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.013*** 0.001 0.008** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Threshold point 0.193 1.010 0.425 -0.023 
Confidence interval 0.187-0.211 0.601-1.265 0.122-0.724 -0.578-0.621 
Observations 900 900 900 900 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The results are obtained by estimating Eq. (3.2). 
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Table 3.7 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models with interaction effects in the advanced and emerging countries 
 Advanced countries Developing countries 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.589*** 0.623*** 0.638*** 0.916*** 0.176** 0.274*** 0.238*** 0.267*** 
 (0.114) (0.104) (0.106) (0.092) (0.083) (0.082) (0.081) (0.078) 
FD -0.005 -0.015*** -0.002 -0.005*** 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD 
in the lower regime) 
-1.806 -0.543 -2.693 0.252 0.096 1.439* 0.104*** 0.092*** 
 (2.597) (0.454) (2.193) (0.493) (0.199) (0.849) (0.020) (0.020) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD 
in the higher regime) 
1.175** 6.216*** 1.109** 2.726 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.194 1.172 
 (0.527) (1.217) (0.533) (1.695) (0.018) (0.019) (0.292) (0.872) 
Economy size 0.017* 0.015** 0.011 0.013* -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.012** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Government size 0.044 0.084 0.047 -0.004 0.005 0.030 0.018 0.043 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.063) (0.060) (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) 
Recession dummy 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.026** 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.0002 0.016*** 0.002 0.011*** -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Threshold point 0.379 1.036 0.379 0.701 0.193 0.707 0.216 -0.023 
Confidence interval 0.362-0.392 1.000-1.134 0.352-0.388 -1.255-0.866 0.187-0.211 0.609-0.712 0.110-0.971 -0.613-0.023 
Observations 432 432 432 432 468 468 468 468 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. Results are obtained by 
estimating Eq. (3.2). 
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Considering the interaction effects of inflation volatility with financial sector 
development, I find that the interaction effects are significant and positive for the growth 
volatility in the two regimes in the advanced and emerging countries. Specifically, in the 
advanced countries, the influence in the higher regime is significantly larger than the 
influence in the lower regime. The magnifying effect of financial sector development in 
the higher regime is not very significant in the emerging countries. This finding shows that 
most advanced countries have more developed financial sectors, effectively transmit 
monetary policies and magnify the nominal volatility shock, compared with the emerging 
countries. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) also argue that bank lending (credit channel) might 
play an important role in the amplification and propagation of monetary policy shocks to 
real variables. In the control variables, in the advanced countries, economy size and trade 
openness have positive significant influences on the growth volatility but government size 
and the recession dummy are not significant. 
3.4 Robustness tests 
3.4.1 Additional control and alternative variables 
Easterly et al. (2001), Kose et al. (2003) and Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) 
document the significant connections with financial openness and macroeconomic 
volatility. In order to distinguish the effects of financial sector development and financial 
openness (liberalization) on the growth volatility, I collect the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and 
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Ito 2006) to proxy financial openness and add it in the regression model. Table 3.8 shows 
that most variables keep their expected influences, including the first lagged growth 
volatility, financial sector development, the inflation volatility shock and the control 
variables. Using domestic credit to proxy financial sector development, I observe that 
financial sector development in the higher regime could increase growth volatility. 
Financial openness negatively affects growth volatility. Using banking health to proxy 
financial sector development, banking health and financial openness both have significant 
negative impacts on growth volatility. It supports that financial openness and financial 
sector development have their distinct roles on diminishing growth volatility.  
Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Tang et al. (2008) argue technology progress 
and institution quality can stabilize growth volatility. In order to investigate the effects of 
technology progress and institution quality on the growth volatility, I collect the 
theoretical duration of secondary education (years) to show the education investment and 
use the mortality rate to reflect the high-tech medical treatment and public health 
measures
22
. Both indicators can proxy for human capital investment and technological 
progress (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002, 2003). In the second transmission channel, human capital 
could promote technological progress, increase economic growth and then reduce growth 
volatility since there is a significant negative connection with volatility and economic 
                                                          
22 I collect the theoretical duration of secondary education (years) and the mortality rate from World 
Development Indicators database. 
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growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aghion et al., 2004). Meanwhile, I collect “Law and 
Order” in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to show law and institution quality 
(Agrast et al., 2013)
23
.  
Using domestic credit as a proxy for financial sector development, I observe that the 
theoretical duration of secondary education (years) and the mortality rate have significant 
negative influences on the growth volatility since the large human capital accumulation 
could promote technology progress, economic growth and reduce growth volatility. The 
rule of law also has a significant negative influence on the growth volatility. It means that 
law and institution quality can diminish growth volatility since it provides a good 
regulation and environment for financial development. While using banking health as a 
proxy for financial sector development, I find that the mortality rate and the rule of law 
also have negative relationships with growth volatility. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 “Law and Order” is a single component but its two elements are assessed separately, with each 
element being scored from zero to three points. To assess the “Law” element, the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system are considered, while the “Order” element is an assessment of popular observance of 
the law. Thus, a country can have a high rating 3 in terms of its judicial system, but have a low rating 1 if it 
suffers from a very high crime rate or the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction.  
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Table 3.8 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models with additional control variables 
Growth volatility 
DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.438*** 0.411*** 0.415*** 0.392*** 0.470*** 0.443*** 0.445*** 0.431*** 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
FD in the lower regime -0.010 -0.015* -0.014 -0.073* -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.041) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FD in the higher regime 0.011* 0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.008*** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inflation volatility 0.122*** 0.113*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Economy size 0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Trade openness 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.008** 0.014*** 0.010** 0.014*** 0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government size 0.073* 0.061 0.041 0.065 0.055 0.056 0.042 0.055 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Recession dummy 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial openness  -0.009    -0.009*    
 (0.006)    (0.005)    
Duration of secondary education  -0.007**    -0.004   
  (0.003)    (0.003)   
Mortality rate   -0.038**    -0.043***  
   (0.016)    (0.015)  
Rule of law    -0.004**    -0.004** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
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Constant 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013 -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Threshold point 1.307 0.694 0.694 0.281 0.621 0.621 0.621 0.613 
Confidence interval  0.123-1.385 0.167-1.385 0.123-1.385 0.123-1.385 -1.603- 0.844 -1.603-0.843 -1.603-0.844 -1.603-0.843 
Observations 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. The regression model is 
shown as:  
1 1 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it it it it it it it it it it it it
it it it i it
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    
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Table 3.9 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models with interaction effects of 
PPI volatility 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.345*** 0.327*** 0.417*** 0.471*** 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) 
FD -0.012** -0.019*** -0.004 -0.003*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Inflation volatility *I(FD in 
the lower regime)  
-0.059 0.020 0.123 0.054 
 (0.437) (0.303) (0.200) (0.154) 
Inflation volatility *I (FD in 
the higher regime) 
0.414*** 0.360** 0.491** 0.483*** 
 (0.143) (0.152) (0.197) (0.147) 
Economy size -0.005 -0.014** -0.009 -0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade openness 0.008 0.008 0.010* 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Government size -0.034 0.024 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) 
Recession dummy 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.018** -0.008** 0.011** -0.0005 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Threshold point 0.192 0.992 0.352 0.109 
Confidence interval 0.179-1.018 0.940-1.016 0.220-1.473 -1.475-0.831 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. I use PPI volatility to represent the inflation volatility shock. The results are 
obtained by estimating Eq. (3.2). 
Robustly, I use PPI volatility to reflect inflation volatility
24
, which is defined as the 
standard deviation of PPI. Table 3.9 shows that the effect of first lagged growth volatility 
is significant and positive. Financial sector development has a significant and negative 
                                                          
24 I also obtain the significant positive effect of inflation volatility on the growth volatility when I 
estimate the Eq. (3.1) by using PPI volatility to represent the inflation volatility shock. I do not report the 
results because of the limitations of space.  
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effect on the growth volatility, by using the proxies like private credit, credit allocation 
and banking health. In the interaction effects of inflation volatility with financial sector 
development, it is evident that inflation volatility has a significant positive influence on the 
growth volatility in the higher regime but its influence is not significant in the lower 
regime. It supports the previous conclusion again that excessive financial sector 
development might magnify the inflation volatility shock (see Beck et al., 2006 Arcand et 
al., 2012; Dabla-Norris and Srivisal, 2013). In the control variables, economy size 
negatively affects growth volatility and trade openness positively affects growth volatility, 
respectively. However, government size and the recession dummy are not significant. 
3.4.2 Tests on the endogeneity of inflation volatility 
Since growth volatility and inflation volatility are codetermined, which might result in 
endogeneity, I use the first lagged inflation volatility to replace inflation volatility and use 
the central bank assets to GDP as an instrument variable (IV) to be robustness tests, 
respectively. After I use the first lagged inflation volatility to substitute inflation volatility 
and estimate Eq. (3.1), Table 3.10 demonstrates that growth volatility has a significant 
first lagged positive autocorrelation pattern. Financial sector development significantly 
reduces growth volatility in the lower regime. Inflation volatility has a significant positive 
impact on the growth volatility. The control variables keep their expected effects. 
Furthermore, using the central bank assets to GDP to be an instrument variable for 
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inflation volatility, I observe that inflation volatility also has a significant positive impact 
on the growth volatility and the other variables kept their expected influences as above. 
These show that the negative relationship of financial sector development and growth 
volatility in the lower regime is very robust.  
To test whether financial sector development magnifies or dampens the effect of 
inflation volatility on the growth volatility, I use the first lagged inflation volatility to 
replace inflation volatility and then estimate Eq. (3.2). Table 3.11 exhibits the interaction 
of inflation volatility with financial sector development has a positive influence on the 
growth volatility in the two regimes but its influence in the higher regime is significantly 
larger than that in the lower regime. Regarding the central bank assets to GDP to be an 
instrument variable for inflation volatility, I observe the interaction of inflation volatility 
with financial sector development has a positive influence on growth volatility in two 
regimes but I do not find its influences in the higher regime are significantly larger than 
that in the lower regime. The other variables keep their expected effects as above. In 
summary, I confirm that the results I obtain in this paper are very robust after taking 
endogeneity into consideration. 
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Table 3.10 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models using more instrument variables 
 Inflation volatility = The first lagged inflation volatility Inflation volatility = Central bank assets to GDP (IV) 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.355*** 0.348*** 0.398*** 0.432*** 0.365*** 0.370*** 0.408*** 0.453*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.070) (0.066) (0.064) 
FD in the lower regime 0.113 -0.042*** -0.016 -0.003*** 0.101 -0.104** -0.080* -0.003*** 
 (0.122) (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.131) (0.045) (0.045) (0.001) 
FD in the higher regime -0.007 -0.005 0.0004 -0.008*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.0005 -0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Inflation volatility 0.074* 0.049* 0.075*** 0.059** 1.216* 0.780 1.720** 1.536** 
 (0.040) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.674) (0.719) (0.695) (0.684) 
Economy size 0.0003 -0.003 0.0004 0.0001 0.002 -0.002 0.0001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government size 0.024 0.015 0.041 0.041 -0.008 0.004 0.020 0.016 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Recession dummy 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.006 0.031*** 0.016*** -0.009*** -0.001 0.061** 0.014 -0.011*** 
 (0.020) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.021) (0.026) (0.009) (0.003) 
Threshold point 0.193 0.601 0.694 0.621 0.192 0.680 0.281 0.621 
Confidence interval 0.189-0.197 0.590-0.992 0.122-1.388 -1.608-0.846 0.189-0.197 0.581-1.164 0.116-1.419 -1.638-0.721 
Observations 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. The results are obtained 
by Eq. (3.1). 
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Table 3.11 The results of the dynamic panel threshold models with interaction effects using more instrument variables 
 Inflation volatility = The first lagged inflation volatility Inflation volatility = Central bank assets to GDP (IV) 
Growth volatility 
PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH PRIVATE CREDEP DOMESTIC HEALTH 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth volatility (-1) 0.326*** 0.344*** 0.393*** 0.425*** 0.350*** 0.387*** 0.386*** 0.443*** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) 
FD -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD in 
the lower regime) 
0.037 0.021 0.049 0.044** 1.328 0.270 4.488** 6.098*** 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (2.713) (1.091) (2.208) (1.688) 
Inflation volatility*I(FD in 
the higher regime) 
0.511 0.367 0.557* 0.602 1.279* 1.260 0.972 0.720 
 (0.311) (0.223) (0.304) (0.711) (0.664) (0.885) (0.634) (0.670) 
Economy size 0.001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.0004 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Trade openness 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government size 0.019 0.019 0.038 0.033 -0.009 0.002 0.019 0.021 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
Recession dummy 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.009 -0.002 0.014 0.016 -0.007 -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Threshold point 0.193 0.601 0.167 -0.023 0.192 0.601 0.229 -1.115 
Confidence interval 0.184-0.216 0.600-1.378 0.122-0.710 -1.116-0.703 0.165-0.211 0.600-1.260 0.116-0.234 -1.375--0.569 
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5 % and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. The results are obtained 
by Eq. (3.2). 
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3.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, I investigate the growth volatility in the 50 countries from 1997 to 2014 
and find that the aggregate growth volatility in the global has a declining trend but soars 
in the South American Economic Crisis (2002-2003), the Global Financial Crisis 
(2008-2009) and the European Debt Crisis (2010-2012). The advanced countries have 
the smaller growth volatility than emerging countries. By applying the dynamic panel 
threshold model to investigate the nonlinear effect of financial sector development on the 
growth volatility, it is evident that growth volatility has a significant and positive first 
lagged autocorrelation pattern. Financial sector development could reduce growth 
volatility by using banking credit and health indicators in the lower regime. Regarding 
the shock of inflation volatility, I confirm that financial sector development can magnify 
its effect on the growth volatility in the higher regime, especially in the advanced 
countries. Furthermore, I find that economy size and trade openness have significant 
positive influences on the growth volatility. 
In the robustness tests, it is evident that financial openness, human capital 
investment, law and institution quality significantly reduce growth volatility. I also 
obtain very similar results by using the alternative inflation volatility variable (PPI 
volatility). To handle the endogeneity in the models, I apply the first lagged inflation 
volatility and the central bank assets to GDP as instrument variables to replace inflation 
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volatility, respectively. The results demonstrate that my results are very robust, that is, 
inflation volatility positively affects the growth volatility and excessive financial sector 
development magnifies the shock of inflation volatility on the growth volatility. My 
results reveal the importance of governments and regulation institutions keeping 
financial sector development in a single optimal level. This is helpful in reducing 
aggregate fluctuations and dampening the inflation shocks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. REVISTING BANK CREDIT AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
4.1 Introduction 
Some classical papers investigate the sources of economic cyclical fluctuations and 
focus on the roles of financial factors on the business cycle. In the early age, Schumpeter 
(1934) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) emphasize the close relationship between the 
financial cycle and the business cycle. Bernanke et al. (1996) find that financial factors can 
amplify business cycle fluctuations. When investment projects become more risky or 
difficult to evaluate, credit supply falls and business cycle movements emerge. Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) emphasize the roles played by movements of credit and asset price in 
shaping macroeconomic aggregate changes over the business cycle. They think that the 
changes of external financing supply can affect corporations and households, and thereby 
influence aggregate business cycles.  
Recently, Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008) observe that a long financial sector cycle is 
coupled with a greater synchronization with the real economy. Nolan and Thoenissen 
(2009) and Mandelman (2010) find the shocks from the financial sector play an important 
role as a source of business cycle fluctuations. Jordà et al. (2013) argue that financial 
factors play an essential role in the cyclical fluctuations in the fourteen developed 
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economies from 1870 to 2008. Caldara et al. (2016) also observe that financial shocks 
become an important source of cyclical fluctuations since the mid-1980. Ma and Zhang 
(2016) suggest the financial cycle shock becomes a main driving force for macroeconomic 
fluctuations, especially during the financial instability period.  
Furthermore, the business cycle is thought as asymmetric and non-identical 
mirror-image (Mitchell, 1927; Keynes, 1936; Sichel, 1993; Ramsey and Rothman, 1996). 
It is thought that output cycles tend to have the asymmetric longer expansionary and 
shorter contractionary phases (Egert and Sutherland, 2014) and the effects of the credit 
cycle are asymmetric in the business expansions and contractions (Bartoletto et al., 2015). 
Therefore, I believe the linear models are not a good fit with the asymmetric patterns of 
the business cycle.  
In order to make up for the deficiency of the linear models, I employ quantile 
regression to investigate the asymmetric effects of bank credit on the business cycle. The 
change of the business cycle after the financial crisis is tested because of the 
implementation of Basil II (see Lowe and Segoviano, 2002; Kashyap and Stein, 2004; 
Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005). The roles of the other financial factors on the business 
cycle are also explored, including M2 supply and stock price. The empirical results show 
that bank credit is pro-cyclical and amplifies the business cycle. This effect is larger in the 
economic peak and trough, which forms a U-shape curve. The influences of M2 supply 
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and stock price on the business cycle also show the U-shaped. Bank credit supply behavior 
constrains after financial crisis and then negatively affects the business cycle. 
The asymmetry of the business cycle is explored by a large number of papers. 
Mitchell (1927) and Keynes (1936) observe that business contractions are more sudden, 
violent and briefer than business expansions, and business contractions. Sichel (1993) and 
Ramsey and Rothman (1996) find that a real output series has depth if its troughs are 
deeper than its expansions, and has steepness if its downturns are steeper than its 
expansions. It is widely thought that the distribution of GDP, business fluctuations and 
other macroeconomic aggregates are asymmetric. For example, Bodman (2001) explores 
the asymmetries in the Australian macroeconomic time series and finds the evidence of 
steepness. Narayan and Narayan (2008) explore the asymmetries in the macroeconomic 
time series in the three Asian economies and conclude that most of the series are 
characterized by asymmetric behaviors. Narayan (2009) also examines the asymmetric 
behavior of per capita GDP in the eleven OECD countries and documents that per capita 
GDP displays a substantial asymmetric behavior. 
Regarding the roles of bank credit on the business cycle, Halvorsen and Jacobsen 
(2014) think that the bank plays a vital role in the financial system since the bank 
specializes in overcoming informational problems and is a predominant source of credit 
supply. Many papers document that bank credit is pro-cyclical and amplifies the business 
cycle. Asea and Blomberg (1998) document that bank lending drives and amplifies the 
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overall real business cycle in the United States. Using 44 countries over 50 years, 
Claessens et al. (2012) show that the rapid credit growth tends to amplify the economic 
expansions. Apostoaie et al. (2014) confirm a strong relationship of a pro-cyclical nature 
between the credit cycle and the business cycle in the 12 European countries. Egert and 
Sutherland (2014) provide the new evidence on the banking sector’s pro-cyclicality by 
using the aggregate and bank-level data in the OECD countries. Halvorsen and Jacobsen 
(2014) observe that an adverse bank lending shock contracts output in Norway and UK by 
applying the structural VARs from 1988 to 2010. They suggest that the financial sector is 
an important source of economic shocks. Ibrahim (2016) finds that the aggregate bank 
credit is pro-cyclical, regarding 21 conventional banks and 16 Islamic banks from 2001 to 
2013. The pro-cyclicality of bank credit on the business cycle is supported by Bertay et al. 
(2015) by using the data of 633 banks in the 111 countries from 1999 to 2010. Mimir 
(2016) also shows that bank credit is pro-cyclical and explores the joint roles of financial 
shocks and credit frictions in driving the real and financial fluctuations.  
It is well known that various actions were taken by governments around the world to 
address the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis. One of the most important measures 
was to increase the regulation on the banking system, such as the implementation of Basel 
II. Although limited, there is also some evidence of pro-cyclical effects arising from the 
application of Basel II (Lowe and Segoviano, 2002; Kashyap and Stein, 2004). Pederzoli 
and Torricelli (2005) argue that the main object of minimum capital requirements in Basel 
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II is to make the capital requirements more risk-sensitive. The increased risk-sensitivity of 
capital requirements raises the concerns about a possible pro-cyclicality side-effect due to 
the dependence of credit risk on the business cycle.  
Regarding other economic determinants of the business cycle, Kose et al. (2003), 
Bejan (2006), Bekaert et al. (2006), Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and Claessens et al. 
(2012) find that business cycle fluctuations are related with trade openness though the 
pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical characteristics of trade openness are uncertain. Lane 
(2003), Gali and Perotti (2003), Alesina et al. (2008) and Magud (2008) mention that 
business cycle fluctuations are attributed to the impacts of fiscal policy whereas fiscal 
policy may be expansionary or contractionary in terms of output. Furthermore, Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2011a, b) investigate the asymmetric responses of GDP on the oil price shocks. 
Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016, 2017) suggest that the effects of oil shocks are widespread 
in the global economy. Kose and Yi (2006), Faia (2007), Kose, et al. (2008) and Claessens 
et al. (2012) confirm the significant inter-correlations of the business cycles among the 
countries. Furthermore, Baxter and Stockman (1989) find that the business cycle is largely 
influenced by the variability of the real exchange rate under the fixed and flexible 
exchange rate systems. Duarte et al. (2007) document the empirical evidence on the 
business cycle relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic aggregates in 36 
countries.  
  104 
However, I find that most theoretical and empirical models in macroeconomics apply 
the linear adjustment mechanisms, which implies that the responses of economic variables 
to shocks are symmetric. However, the business cycle is thought of as asymmetric and 
non-identical mirror-image (Mitchell, 1927; Keynes, 1936; Sichel, 1993; Ramsey and 
Rothman, 1996). Bodman (2001) finds that the types of shocks to affect business cycles 
might be different or the propagation mechanism might be different over the business 
cycle. Kiani and Bidarkota (2004) explain that the nonlinearities can seriously influence 
the persistence of monetary policies and affect other shocks on the output based on the 
linear models. Therefore, I believe that the linear models are not sufficient to deal with the 
business cycle with asymmetrical behavior.  
In the case of the asymmetric relationship with bank credit and the business cycle, 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) confirm that credit risk of bank is closely linked to the 
phases of the business cycle. Adrian and Shin (2010) attribute that bank leverage is high 
during economic booms and low during busts so that the banks tend to provide more 
credits to the business during economic booms and cut the new credits during busts. 
Bartoletto et al. (2015) carry out some statistical tests on the co-movement between the 
credit and the business cycle in Italy and show that the co-movement proves weaker in 
recessions. Furthermore, Garcia and Schaller (2002) use a measurement for monetary 
policy shocks and find monetary policy has the larger effects during a recession than 
during an expansion. Lo and Piger (2005) account for the different forms of asymmetry in 
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the monetary transmission mechanism and confirm the asymmetric transmission of 
monetary policy over contractions and expansions in the business cycle. They find that 
monetary policy innovations have greater impacts on output during contractions. Santoro 
et al. (2014) also show that monetary policy has stronger effects on the GDP during 
contractions, compared with expansions. Considering the asymmetric relationship of bank 
credit and the business cycle, I apply an approach of quantile regression to investigate their 
relationship in this paper. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Regression model 
I apply the quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and the quantile 
regression for panel data (QRPD) (Powell, 2016a) to explore the asymmetric relationship 
of bank credit with the business cycle. The QRPD estimator is thought as the first quantile 
panel data estimator to provide the estimation which can be interpreted in the same manner 
as the cross-sectional regression results while the fixed effects are allowed to be arbitrarily 
correlated with the variables of interest. Besides, the interpretation of QRPD parallels the 
interpretation of the bounds by using the Chernozhukov et al. (2013) framework. 
Chernozhukov et al. (2013) discuss the identification of bounds on quantile effects in 
nonseparable panel models with exogenous variables and show that these bounds tighten 
as T increases. 
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A further advantage of the QRPD refers that the moment conditions are simple to 
interpret and implement since the individual fixed effects are never estimated or even 
specified. Therefore, the number of estimated parameters is smaller and the 
implementation of this estimator is simpler, compared with other most quantile panel data 
estimators (e.g. Koenker, 2004; Lamarche, 2010; Galvao, 2011; Kato et al., 2012 and 
Rosen, 2012). The properties of the moment conditions are also helpful to further reduce 
the number of estimated parameters independently.  
In order to investigate the effects of bank credit on the business cycle in the different 
phases, I apply the quantile regression for panel data (QRPD) (Powell, 2016a) to estimate 
the following model, which is shown as:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it it t itGDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL                   (4.1) 
where GDP is the business cycle measured by log GDP. CREDIT is bank credit measured 
by log credit, which is the variable of interest in this paper. POST is the dummy variable to 
distinguish the periods before or after the global financial crisis (POST = 1 from the global 
financial crisis in 2008). The control variables include government expenditure (GOV), 
trade openness (TRADE) and oil price (OIL). it  is the error term. i  and t  denote the 
country and time, respectively. In line with Powell (2016b), the more control variables can 
predict the placement in the distribution relative to the quantile function
25
. I also use 
                                                          
25 I use the qregpd package in STATA to fit the quantile regression for panel data (QRPD) estimator 
developed in Powell (2016a).  
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additional control variables in the robustness tests, including world output (OUTPUT) and 
foreign exchange rate (FX). Meanwhile, I apply the alternative financial factors in this 
paper, including M2 supply (M2) and stock market price (STOCK). All the variables are 
detrended by the Hodrick–Prescott filter to get the cyclicality and the smoothing parameter 
is set as 1600
26
. The detailed description could be found in Table 4.1. 
4.2.2 Data 
In this paper, I collect the data of 42 countries and select 18 countries for my 
investigation because I do not find the significant positive relationships of bank credit and 
the business cycle in the other 24 countries by using the quantile regression (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978). I collect the real GDP, import, export and world output data from the 
Global Economic Monitor (GEM) and collect bank credit and real effective exchange rate 
from the Bank of International Settlements Statistics. I also obtain the world price of oil 
from the International Financial Statistics in IMF and collect M2 supply and MSCI stock 
price index from the Datastream. The data I use in this paper are quarterly from 1999 to 
2016.  
Table 4.2 shows the results of the descriptive statistics and the normality tests on the 
business cycle in each sample country. I observe that Russia (0.025) has the largest 
volatility followed by Greece (0.024) and Hong Kong (0.022). However, the volatility in 
                                                          
26 In this paper, I explore the level asymmetry (deepness) of the business cycle, which refers to the 
unconditional distribution of detrended output levels. It is different from the growth rate asymmetry, which 
refers to the unconditional distribution of output changes.  
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Australia (0.005), Indonesia (0.005) and New Zealand (0.010) is smaller. Greece (-0.028) 
and Russia (-0.026) have a larger downside amplitude (10% quantile) but Australia 
(-0.008) and Indonesia (-0.007) have a larger downside amplitude (10% quantile). 
Besides, it is evident that Greece (0.033) has the largest upside amplitude (90% quantile), 
followed by Hong Kong (0.029) and Russia (0.023). Australia (0.008) and Indonesia 
(0.005) have a smaller upside amplitude (90% quantile). Regarding the descriptive 
statistics in the pool data of the advanced and emerging countries, I observe that the 
advanced countries have a smaller volatility, downside amplitude and upside amplitude 
than the emerging countries, whose findings are consistent to Kose et al. (2003) and 
Calderón and Fuentes (2014). They argue that emerging countries experience the greater 
macroeconomic volatility. 
In order to test the normality of the business cycle for each country, I apply the 
Skewness test, the Kurtosis test, the Normal test and the Shapiro-Wilk test. I observe that 
most countries have negative skewness, except New Zealand, United Kingdom, Colombia 
and Russia. Negative skewness in the distribution of detrended output levels shows the 
presence of slow increases and sudden decreases of output. The results of the Kurtosis test 
show that the most values are significant and positive. These results show that the business 
cycles in the most countries are asymmetric and fat-tailed. 
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Table 4.1 Variables and their meanings 
Type Variables Meanings 
Economic movement Business cycle GDP at market prices, constant 2010 USD 
Financial factors 
Bank credit Credit for non financial sector (Market value in USD) 
M2 supply Money supply M2, standardized USD, 2010 prices  
Stock price  MSCI stock market index (USD) 
Post financial crisis  Time dummy variable The dummy variable equals to 1 from 2008  
Control variables 
Government 
expenditure 
Government consumption, standardized USD, 2010 
prices 
Foreign exchange rate 
BIS effective exchange rate, real (CPI-based), 
2010=100 
Trade openness 
(Export plus import)/GDP, constant 2010 USD, 
millions 
Oil price Crude Oil (petroleum), price index, 2005 = 100,  
World output 
Total GDP of OECD (high income) and China, constant 
2010 USD 
Note: Oil price is a simple average of three spot prices, that is, Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the 
Dubai Fateh. All the variables are detrended by using the Hodrick–Prescott filter and the smoothing 
parameter is set as 1600. 
In the results of the Normal test and the Shapiro-Wilk test, I further find that the 
business cycles of some advanced countries are significantly asymmetric and fat-tailed 
because the P-values are much less than 0.05, including Canada, Israel, South Korea and 
United Kingdom. The business cycles of the emerging countries are also significantly 
asymmetric and fat-tailed, including Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia and 
Thailand. The pool data for the business cycles of the advanced and emerging countries 
obviously are both asymmetric and fat-tailed. It shows the necessity to apply the quantile 
regression to investigate the business cycle for the sample countries. 
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Table 4.2 The basic features of the business cycle 
 Volatility 10% quantile  50% quantile 90% quantile Skewness test Kurtosis test Normal test Shapiro–Wilk test 
Advanced countries 
Australia 0.005 -0.008 0.0003 0.008 -0.011 -0.242 0.953 0.873 
Canada 0.011 -0.014 0.0003 0.013 -0.917*** 1.277* 0.005 0.005 
Greece 0.024 -0.028 0.0003 0.033 -0.127 -0.326 0.784 0.118 
Hong Kong 0.022 -0.025 0.0007 0.029 -0.417 1.184* 0.072 0.117 
Israel 0.017 -0.017 -0.0021 0.022 0.707** 2.329*** 0.005 0.006 
New Zealand 0.010 -0.010 -0.0007 0.011 0.148 0.958 0.243 0.124 
South Korea 0.012 -0.013 0.0004 0.014 -1.055*** 2.729*** 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.012 -0.011 -0.0007 0.012 0.358 1.830** 0.038 0.000 
United States 0.011 -0.016 0.0004 0.015 -0.301 0.018 0.527 0.559 
Pool data 0.015 -0.016 -0.0001 0.017 -0.174* 2.725*** 0.000 0.000 
Emerging countries 
Brazil 0.017 -0.022 0.0027 0.021 -0.438 0.001 0.276 0.320 
Chile 0.016 -0.021 0.0012 0.017 -0.610** 0.290 0.085 0.066 
Colombia 0.013 -0.017 -0.0013 0.016 0.365 -0.345 0.369 0.286 
India 0.014 -0.017 -0.0009 0.015 -0.289 1.036 0.139 0.379 
Indonesia  0.005 -0.007 -0.0001 0.005 0.839*** 1.603** 0.005 0.007 
Malaysia 0.016 -0.010 0.0010 0.015 -0.681** 4.390*** 0.003 0.000 
Mexico 0.017 -0.018 -0.0007 0.023 -0.559** 1.153* 0.041 0.010 
Russia 0.025 -0.026 -0.0066 0.023 0.667** 1.713** 0.012 0.003 
Thailand 0.018 -0.019 0.0024 0.017 -1.787*** 5.515*** 0.000 0.000 
Pool data 0.017 -0.018 -0.0001 0.018 -0.219** 3.219*** 0.000 0.000 
Note: I use the standard deviation of detrended GDP to measure the volatility of the business cycle for each sample country. The values in the columns of 
the Normal test and the Shapiro–Wilk test are P-values.  
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Table 4.3 The correlations of the variables  
 Business cycle Bank credit M2 supply Stock price 
Post financial 
crisis 
Fiscal 
expenditure 
Trade 
openness 
Oil price 
Business cycle  1.000        
Bank credit 0.441*** 1.000       
M2 supply 0.473*** 0.748*** 1.000      
Stock price 0.500*** 0.624*** 0.601*** 1.000     
Post financial crisis -0.046* -0.016 -0.007 -0.067** 1.000    
Fiscal expenditure 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.195*** 0.078*** 0.034 1.000   
Trade openness 0.237*** 0.121*** 0.066** 0.181** 0.034 -0.025 1.000  
Oil price 0.427*** 0.430*** 0.377*** 0.539*** -0.021 0.030 0.234*** 1.000 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All the variables are detrended by the Hodrick–Prescott filter to get 
their cyclicality. The smoothing parameter is set as 1600.  
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Table 4.3 shows the correlations of the variables in this paper. In particular, bank 
credit, M2 supply and stock price have the significant positive relationships with the 
business cycle. The correlation coefficients of the business cycle with bank credit, M2 
supply and stock price are 0.159, 0.126 and 0.541, respectively. The dummy variable of 
the post financial crisis is negatively correlated with the business cycle since Basel II is 
taken to increases the requirement of bank capital, increase risk-sensitiveness and then 
decreases the capacity of bank to supply credit. Moreover, fiscal expenditure, trade 
openness and oil price have positive impacts on the business cycle. 
4.3 Empirical Results 
Regarding the asymmetric and fat-tailed features of the business cycle, I use the OLS 
and the quantile estimation method (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to investigate the 
asymmetric effects of bank credit on the business cycle for each sample country. Table 4.4 
shows that the most countries have significant positive effects of bank credit on the 
business cycle. In the results of the OLS estimation, it is evident that United States (0.235), 
Chile (0.221) and India (0.196) have larger significant positive effects of bank credit on the 
business cycle but the positive effects on the business cycle are smaller in Australia 
(0.031), New Zealand (0.051) and Indonesia (0.042).  
In the results of the quantile regression, I observe that the effects of bank credit on the 
business cycle are significant and positive in most countries and in most of the quantiles. 
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In particular, I observe that the effects of bank credit on the business cycle are larger below 
30% quantiles and above 70% quantiles, which show a U-shaped curve. In economic 
recessions, the explanatory monetary polices tend to be applied and bank lending plays an 
important role in the amplification of monetary policy shocks on real variables (see 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In the economic booms, the bank tends to increase credit 
supply. Furthermore, large heterogeneity exists among the sample countries. Specifically, 
bank credit has significant and positive effects on the business cycle only in the low 
quantiles in Hong Kong and Malaysia, where the explanatory monetary policy shows very 
effective to help the economic recovery. However, Colombia and the United States have 
significant and positive relationships of bank credit and the business cycle in the higher 
quantiles. In the case of Brazil and Chile, the effects of bank credit are larger in the lower 
quantiles and decrease with the increase of quantile points.  
Alternatively, the effects of bank credit on the business cycle increase with the 
increase of quantile points in Thailand. The effects of bank credit on the business cycle are 
larger in the middle quantiles in Indonesia. These results present the effects of bank credit 
on the business cycle change in the different business cycle phases for the different 
countries. My findings demonstrate that bank credit shows pro-cyclical and amplifies the 
business cycle but its roles on the business cycle are asymmetric (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Bartoletto et al., 2015). The asymmetric 
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effects might be caused by the expansionary or contractionary monetary policy (Garcia 
and Schaller, 2002; Lo and Piger, 2005; Santoro et al., 2014). 
In order to investigate the overall effect of bank credit on the business cycle for all the 
sample countries, I apply the panel quantile regression (PQRD) (Powell, 2016a) in this 
section. In the results of the FGLS estimation, Table 4.5 shows that bank credit has a 
positive impact on the business cycle. It means that bank credit is pro-cyclical and 
amplifies the business cycle. The dummy variable of the post financial crisis negatively 
affects the business cycle since the requirement of capital, liquidity management and 
supervision improve after global financial crisis, which constrains the bank capacity to 
allocate credit to the firms. Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of fiscal 
expenditure is significant positive, which means that the business cycle is positively 
correlated with fiscal policy. Furthermore, I observe that trade openness and oil price have 
significant and positive effects on the business cycle, which shows that external economic 
shocks aggravate the business cycle. 
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Table 4.4 The results of the quantile regression for each sample country 
 OLS 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Advanced countries 
Australia 0.031*** 0.044** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033** 0.022* 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Canada 0.109*** 0.130** 0.118** 0.115** 0.107* 0.078* 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.129*** 
 (0.023) (0.055) (0.056) (0.053) (0.055) (0.044) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.035) 
Greece 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.129* 0.104* 0.104* 0.044 0.079 0.147*** 0.179*** 0.139*** 
 (0.035) (0.047) (0.066) (0.063) (0.061) (0.070) (0.069) (0.050) (0.032) (0.026) 
Hong Kong 0.238** 0.275* 0.327*** 0.205** 0.167** 0.135 0.095 0.085 -0.016 0.055 
 (0.100) (0.142) (0.077) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085) (0.099) (0.168) (0.240) (0.222) 
Israel 0.108*** 0.066 0.105** 0.097** 0.086** 0.108*** 0.095*** 0.112** 0.096 0.305** 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.051) (0.046) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.053) (0.104) (0.140) 
New Zealand 0.051*** 0.041** 0.026** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.053** 0.050* 0.063** 0.078*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) 
South Korea 0.088*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.082** 0.076** 0.064* 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.092*** 0.067* 
 (0.019) (0.042) (0.034) (0.041) (0.039) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.035) 
United Kingdom 0.134*** 0.117** 0.142*** 0.110** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.123*** 0.141*** 0.183*** 
 (0.020) (0.051) (0.051) (0.043) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.047) (0.034) 
United States 0.235** -0.202 0.237 0.232 0.333** 0.466*** 0.500*** 0.422*** 0.540*** 0.654*** 
 (0.112) (0.260) (0.213) (0.149) (0.163) (0.157) (0.128) (0.126) (0.130) (0.108) 
Pool data 0.086*** 0.116*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.099*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) 
Emerging countries 
Brazil 0.097*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.079*** 0.058 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
Chile 0.221*** 0.278*** 0.226*** 0.238*** 0.218*** 0.210*** 0.173*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.228*** 
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 (0.033) (0.069) (0.041) (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.052) (0.071) 
Colombia 0.082** 0.078 0.062* 0.051 0.073** 0.082*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 (0.033) (0.054) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) 
India 0.196*** 0.265*** 0.215** 0.177** 0.145** 0.156*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 
 (0.032) (0.097) (0.087) (0.072) (0.061) (0.049) (0.041) (0.036) (0.045) (0.045) 
Indonesia  0.042*** 0.004 0.032 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.031* 0.041 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.037) 
Malaysia 0.146*** 0.258** 0.161** 0.127* 0.105** 0.084* 0.060 0.063 0.035 0.117 
 (0.051) (0.113) (0.081) (0.065) (0.052) (0.045) (0.046) (0.060) (0.095) (0.145) 
Mexico 0.164*** 0.201** 0.156*** 0.101* 0.082 0.060 0.104 0.176*** 0.133** 0.171*** 
 (0.039) (0.079) (0.051) (0.061) (0.068) (0.071) (0.075) (0.064) (0.052) (0.053) 
Russia 0.148*** 0.149* 0.127*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.148*** 0.145*** 0.178*** 0.201*** 0.226*** 
 (0.023) (0.079) (0.033) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.038) (0.051) (0.055) (0.047) 
Thailand 0.131*** 0.085 0.082** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.194*** 0.212*** 
 (0.032) (0.079) (0.044) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.039) (0.069) 
Pool data 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.130*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in parentheses. The independent 
variable is bank credit and the dependant variable is the business cycle. The number of bootstrap replication is 200. 
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The interesting points lie in the results of the panel quantile regression; Table 4.5 
demonstrates that bank credit has larger positive influences on the business cycle in the 
lower quantiles and higher quantiles, which forms a U-shaped curve. This suggests that 
bank credit has larger effects on the economy in the trough and in the peak. It partially 
supports the opinions of Adrian and Shin (2010). They believe the bank is more likely to 
provide more credit to the business during economic booms. Lo and Piger (2005) and 
Santoro et al. (2014) find that monetary policy innovations have greater impacts on the 
output during contractions, which explains the reasons that the effects of bank credit are 
larger in the trough. 
Table 4.5 The results of the panel quantile regression 
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Bank credit (-1) 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.100*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post financial crisis  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.0003 -0.003*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.031** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.085*** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness (-1) 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.055*** 0.075*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil price (-1) 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is provided in 
parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The number of 
draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The acceptance rate of 
the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it it t itGDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL               
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Table 4.6 The results of the panel quantile regression in the advanced and emerging 
countries  
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Advanced countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Post financial crisis -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.0004 -0.003*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) -0.063* 0.068*** 0.035** -0.034 -0.064*** 0.272*** 
 (0.037) (0.005) (0.014) (0.021) (0.004) (0.000) 
Trade openness (-1) 0.132*** 0.048*** 0.061*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 0.137*** 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Oil price (-1) 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.007*** 0.007 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Emerging countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post financial crisis -0.002** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.0005*** -0.001*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.038*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.057*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trade openness (-1) -0.001 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil price (-1) 0.022*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it it t itGDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL               
Besides, I observe that the dummy variable of the post financial crisis has a significant 
and negative effect in the most quantiles. Its negative effect is larger in the lower quantiles 
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and higher quantiles, which shows an inverted U-shaped curve. It shows the higher capital 
requirement and the more risk-sensitiveness standard set by the bank after the financial 
crisis, which negatively affects the business cycle, such as Basel II. Pederzoli and 
Torricelli (2005) confirm that Basel II could worsen the business cycle due to the reduction 
in credit availability in recession periods. In the control variables, it is evident that fiscal 
expenditure has the expected significant positive effects on the business cycle and its 
effects increase as the quantile points increase. Trade openness and oil price also have 
expected positive effects on the business cycle. The effects of trade openness increase with 
the increase of the quantile points but the effects of oil price decrease with the increase of 
quantile points. 
Regarding the different cyclical fluctuations in the advanced and emerging countries 
(Kose et al., 2003; Calderón and Fuentes, 2014), I split the whole sample into the advanced 
and emerging countries. Table 4.6 demonstrates that most variables keep their expected 
effects on the business cycle. In the results of the FGLS estimation, bank credit and oil 
price have significant positive effects on the business cycle in the two groups of countries. 
The dummy variable of the post financial crisis negatively affects the business cycle. The 
effects of bank credit and oil price are larger on the business cycle in the emerging 
countries. Fiscal expenditure has a significant negative effect on the advanced countries 
and has a significant positive effect on the emerging countries, respectively. This suggests 
that fiscal expenditure is counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical with the business cycle in the 
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different countries. The effect of trade openness on the business cycle is significant 
positive in the advanced countries but is not significant in the emerging countries. 
Compared with the results of the advanced and the emerging countries in the panel 
quantile regression, I observe that bank credit has larger positive effects in the business 
cycle in the emerging countries than the advanced countries. This finding supports that the 
business cycle is more amplified by bank credit in the emerging countries (see Claessens et 
al., 2012). They argue that the relationship between the business cycle and bank credit is 
particularly important in the emerging countries relative to the advanced countries. 
Furthermore, the dummy variable of the post financial crisis negatively affects both 
advanced and emerging countries. In the control variables, the effects of fiscal expenditure 
and trade openness are mixed in the advanced countries and emerging countries, 
respectively. The effects of fiscal expenditure and trade openness on the business cycle 
increase with the increase of quantile points in the advanced countries and emerging 
countries, respectively. The effects of oil price decrease in line with the increase of quantile 
points in the advanced and emerging countries. 
4.4 Robustness tests 
The external economic factors might affect the business cycle (Duarte et al., 2007; 
Claessens et al., 2012). I add world output and foreign exchange rate in the regression 
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models
27
. Table 4.7 shows very similar results as above where bank credit has a positive 
U-shaped influence on the business cycle while the dummy variable of the post financial 
crisis has a negative inverted U-shaped effect on the business cycle. Fiscal expenditure has 
the expected positive effects on the business cycle and the effects of fiscal expenditure 
increase with the increase of quantile points. Furthermore, world output has the significant 
positive effects on the business cycle. This finding confirms the co-movement of the 
international business cycles (Kose and Yi, 2006; Faia, 2007; Kose, et al., 2008; Claessens 
et al., 2012). The roles of world output are significantly larger in the middle and higher 
quantiles points. Furthermore, foreign exchange rate negatively affects the business cycle 
since the appreciation of local currency could dampen the shocks from the external factors 
and then negatively affect the business cycle. The negative effects of foreign exchange rate 
increase in line the increase of the quantile points. 
Regarding the results in the advanced countries and emerging countries, Table 4.8 
shows that bank credit and world output have significant positive effects on the business 
cycle for both types of countries, whose positive effects are larger in the emerging 
countries. The dummy variable of the post financial crisis and foreign exchange rate have a 
negative relationship with the business cycle in the advanced countries and emerging 
countries. The negative effects of foreign exchange rate are larger in the emerging 
countries. 
                                                          
27 Since trade openness and oil price are highly correlated with world output and foreign exchange 
rate, I do not use trade openness and oil price in the original regression models.  
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Table 4.7 The results of the panel quantile regression with additional control variables  
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Bank credit (-1) 0.069*** 0.111*** 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
Post financial crisis -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.0001 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
World output (-1) -0.024*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.054*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Foreign exchange (-1) 0.718*** 0.734*** 0.699*** 0.723*** 0.764*** 0.611*** 
 (0.030) (0.000) (0.046) (0.017) (0.004) (0.001) 
Observations 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it t it itGDP CREDIT POST GOV OUTPUT FX               
In order to ascertain the dynamic patterns of the business cycle, I apply the dynamic 
panel regressions. In the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, Table 4.9 shows 
that the first lagged detrended GDP has a significant positive impact on the business cycle, 
which presents the dynamic patterns of the business cycle. Besides, bank credit, the 
dummy variable of the post financial crisis, fiscal expenditure and oil price keep their 
expected effects on the business cycle but the impact of trade openness is not significant. 
In the results of the dynamic panel quantile regression, it is evident that the autocorrelation 
of the business cycle is small in the lower quantiles and increase in line with the increase of 
quantile points. In addition, the effect of bank credit shows a U-shaped curve and the 
negative impacts of the dummy variable of the post financial crisis are larger in the lower 
  123 
quantiles and higher quantiles. The impacts of fiscal expenditure are larger in the higher 
quantiles and the impacts of oil price are lower in the lower quantiles. 
Table 4.8 The results of the panel quantile regression in the advanced and emerging 
countries with additional control variables 
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Advanced countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.056*** 0.129*** 0.055*** 0.092*** 0.068*** 0.103*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post financial crisis -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.0004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) -0.095*** 0.138*** -0.011*** -0.030* -0.063*** 0.178*** 
 (0.034) (0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.000) (0.003) 
World output (-1) 0.619*** 0.545*** 0.707*** 0.663*** 0.648*** 0.634*** 
 (0.038) (0.019) (0.003) (0.046) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign exchange (-1) -0.024* -0.098*** -0.048*** -0.080*** -0.057*** -0.107*** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Emerging countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Post financial crisis -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.034*** 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
World output (-1) 0.833*** 0.929*** 0.859*** 0.434 0.720*** 0.747*** 
 (0.052) (0.001) (0.002) (0.361) (0.002) (0.017) 
Foreign exchange (-1) -0.029** -0.008*** -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.070*** -0.072*** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model: 
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it t it itGDP CREDIT POST GOV OUTPUT FX               
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Table 4.9 The results of the dynamic panel quantile regression 
Business cycle GMM 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
GDP (-1) 0.740*** 0.702*** 0.771*** 0.778*** 0.773*** 0.769*** 
 (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-1) 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post financial crisis -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.0001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.015* 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness (-1) -0.005 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.0000 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.000) 
Oil price (-1) 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) 
Observations 1111 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 1 3 4 1 5 1 6 1it it it t it it t itGDP GDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL                  
Table 4.10 shows that in the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, the first 
lagged detrended GDP, bank credit and the dummy variable of the post financial crisis 
have the significant negative impacts in the business cycle in the advanced and emerging 
countries. The roles of fiscal expenditure, trade openness and oil price are mixed in the 
both groups of countries. In the results of the dynamic panel quantile regression, the 
autocorrelation of the business cycle is small in the lower quantiles and increase in line 
with the increase of quantile points. The effect of bank credit shows a U-shaped curve and 
the negative impact of the dummy variable of post financial crisis is larger in the lower 
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quantiles and the higher quantiles. The autocorrelation of the business cycle is larger in the 
advanced countries and the roles of bank credit are larger in the emerging countries. 
Furthermore, I investigate the effects of bank credit on the business cycle in the 
different horizons by using 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 lags
28
, respectively. Table 4.11 demonstrates 
that in the whole sample, the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation reveal that the 
bank credits from the first lag to the fourth lag have significant effects on the business 
cycle. The positive effects become the greatest in the second lagged period and then 
gradually decrease. In the results of the panel quantile regression, the effect of the lagged 
bank credit shows a U-shaped curve on the business cycle from the first lag to the fourth 
lag except the coefficients in the third lag in the advanced countries. The results suggest 
that the effects of bank credit diminish as time goes by (see Mimir, 2016). He finds that 
financial variables result in the output fluctuations from one to three quarters. Compared 
with the advanced and emerging countries, it is evident that the effects of bank credit in the 
emerging countries are also larger than the advanced countries in all the lags. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 I do not report the results of the other variables in the regression models in the different horizons because of 
the limited space. 
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Table 4.10 The results of the dynamic panel quantile regression in the advanced and 
emerging countries  
Business cycle GMM 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Advanced countries 
GDP (-1) 0.781*** 0.778*** 0.809*** 0.794*** 0.804*** 0.812*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Bank credit (-1) 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post financial crisis -0.002** -0.001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.005 -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.046*** 
 (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Trade openness (-1) 0.007 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.001*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Oil price (-1) 0.001 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 627 636 636 636 636 636 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Emerging countries 
GDP (-1) 0.666*** 0.598*** 0.738*** 0.762*** 0.756*** 0.715*** 
 (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
Bank credit (-1) 0.023*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Post financial crisis  -0.003*** -0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal expenditure (-1) 0.014 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.032*** 0.013*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Trade openness (-1) -0.010* -0.073*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Oil price (-1) 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 484 493 493 493 493 493 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. The results are obtained by estimating the model: 
1 1 2 1 3 4 1 5 1 6 1it it it t it it t itGDP GDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL                  
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Table 4.11 The results of the panel quantile regression in the different horizons 
Business cycle GMM 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
All the countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.100*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-2) 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.083*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-3) 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) 
Bank credit (-4) 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.100*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advanced countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-2) 0.046*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.111*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-3) 0.037*** 0.129*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Bank credit (-4) 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Emerging countries 
Bank credit (-1) 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Bank credit (-2) 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.123*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) 
Bank credit (-3) 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 0.071*** 0.079*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005) 
Bank credit (-4) 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. Since the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of the other 
variables. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 2 3 4 5it it h t it h it h t h itGDP CREDIT POST GOV TRADE OIL              . The lags (h) are 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
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The strong correlations between financial cycles and real output cycles in many 
countries are documented (Claessens et al., 2009, 2012; Ma and Zhang, 2016). They show 
that financial factors (e.g. credit supply and equity price) play a significant role in 
explaining the duration and amplitude of the different phases of the business cycle. Garcia 
and Schaller (2002), Lo and Piger (2005) and Santoro et al. (2014) document the 
significant effects of monetary policy on the business cycle. In line with their findings, I 
also test the asymmetric roles of the alternative financial factors on the business cycle, 
such as M2 supply and stock price.  
In the results of the FGLS estimation, Table 4.12 shows that M2 supply has a positive 
effect on the business cycle in all the countries. By splitting the advanced and emerging 
countries, I observe that M2 supply has significant positive impacts on the business cycle 
in both groups of countries but the impact of M2 supply on the business cycle is smaller in 
the advanced countries than in the emerging countries. I also employ the panel quantile 
regression to explore the different effects of monetary policy in the economic recessions 
and expansions (Garcia and Schaller, 2002; Lo and Piger, 2005; Santoro et al. 2014). The 
results show that the effects of M2 supply are significant and larger in the lower quantiles 
and higher quantiles, which also forms a U-shape curve like the effects of bank credit. It 
demonstrates that M2 supply could help economy recover in the recessions and might lead 
to overheating in the expansions. It is evident that the effects of M2 supply also form a 
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U-shape for both groups of the countries. In the higher and lower quantiles, the advanced 
countries have the larger effects of M2 supply than the emerging countries. 
Similarly, I examine the effects of stock price on the business cycle. In the result of the 
FGLS estimation in Table 4.13, I find that stock price has a positive effect on the business 
cycle in all the countries. Compared with results of the advanced and the emerging 
countries, it is evident that stock price has significant positive impacts on the business 
cycle in both groups of the countries. However, the impacts on the business cycle in the 
advanced country are smaller. 
Table 4.12 The results of the panel quantile regression with M2 supply 
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
All the countries 
M2 supply (-1) 0.079*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Advanced countries 
M2 supply (-1) 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.164*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Emerging countries 
M2 supply (-1) 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.148*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 
 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. Since the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of the other 
variables. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 12it it t it it t itGDP M POST GOV TRADE OIL               
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The results of the panel quantile regression show that the effects of stock price on the 
business cycle are significant positive in the most quantiles. The effects of stock price are 
smaller in the lower quantiles and increase in line with the increase of quantiles points. 
Compared with the advanced and the emerging countries, it is evident that the effects of 
stock price are larger in the lower quantiles and higher quantiles in the advanced countries. 
In the emerging countries, the effect of stock price increases as the quantile points increase. 
It shows that stock price has a smaller positive effect in the recessions and has a larger 
positive effect in the economic booms. 
Table 4.13 The results of the panel quantile regression with stock price 
Business cycle FGLS 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
All the countries 
Stock price (-1) 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Advanced countries 
Stock price (-1) 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Emerging countries 
Stock price (-1) 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Observations 525 493 493 493 493 493 
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Note: ***, ** and * show the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard error is 
provided in parentheses. The PQRD model uses the adaptive MCMC optimization procedure to specify. The 
number of draws to perform is 1000 and the number of draws to drop as a burn-in period is 100. The 
acceptance rate of the algorithm is 0.5. Since the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of the other 
variables. The results are obtained by estimating the model:  
1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1it it t it it t itGDP STOCK POST GOV TRADE OIL               
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4.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, I apply the quantile regression models to investigate the asymmetric roles 
of bank credit on the business cycle by using the international evidence. The results show 
that bank credit is pro-cyclical and has large effects on the business cycle in this peak and 
trough, which forms a U-shape curve. Compared with the advanced and emerging 
counties, the effects of bank credit are larger in the emerging countries than advanced 
countries. The business cycle after the financial crisis is less prone to fluctuations because 
of the higher capital requirement and the more risk-sensitiveness standard. 
In the robustness tests, bank credit has U-shaped effects on the business cycle by using 
additional control variables and considering the dynamics of business cycle. Besides, the 
effects of bank credit on the business cycle gradually diminish as time goes by. After using 
the alternative financial factors, including M2 supply and stock price, this paper suggests 
that the effects of M2 supply and stock price also show a U- shaped curve, which means 
that financial factors work well in the economic recessions and booms. This paper 
contributes to explore the distinct roles of bank credit on the economy in the different 
business cycle phases.
  132 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrigo, M., Love, I., 2015, Estimation of panel vector autoregression in Stata: A package 
of programs. University of Hawaii, Working paper. 
Acemoglu, D., Zilibotti, F., 1997. Was prometheus unbound by chance? Risk, 
diversification and growth. Journal of Political Economy 105 (4), 709-751. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., Thaicharoen, Y., 2003. Institutional causes, 
macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 50 (1), 49–123. 
Adrian, T., Shin, H., 2010. Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 
(3), 418–437. 
Aghion, P., Banerjee, A., Piketty, T., 1999. Dualism and macroeconomic volatility. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4), 1359-1397. 
Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P., Banerjee, A., 2004. Financial development and the instability of 
open economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 51 (6), 1077–1106. 
Aghion, P., Angeletos, M., Banerjee, A., Manova, K., 2009. Exchange rate volatility and 
productivity growth: The role of financial development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 56 (4), 494-513.  
Agrast, M., Botero, J., Martinez, J., Ponce, A., Pratt, C., WJP Rule of Law Index 
2012-2013. Washington, D. C. The World Justice Project. 
Aivazian, V., Ge, Y., Qiu, J., 2005. The impact of leverage on firm investment: Canadian 
evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (1), 277-291. 
Alesina, A., Campante, F., Tabellini, G., 2008. Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? 
Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (5), 1006–1036. 
Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M., 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal 
of Financial Economics 77 (1), 57–116. 
Andrews, D., Lu, B., 2001. Consistent model and moment selection procedures for GMM 
estimation with application to dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 
101 (1), 123-164. 
  133 
Apostoaie, C., Percic, S., 2014. Credit cycles and business cycles in twenty EU economies. 
Procedia Economics and Finance 15, 1055-1064. 
Arcand, J., Berkes, E., Panizza, U., 2012. Too much finance? IMF Working Paper 12/161, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68 (1), 29-52. 
Asea, P., Blomberg, B., 1998. Lending cycles. Journal of Econometrics 83 (1–2), 89–128. 
Bacchetta, P., Caminal, R., 2000. Do capital market imperfections exacerbate output 
fluctuations? European Economic Review 44 (3), 449–468. 
Bartoletto, S., Chiarini, B., Marzano, E., Piselli, P., 2015. Business cycles, credit cycles 
and bank holdings of sovereign bonds: Historical evidence for Italy 1861-2013, 
CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 5318. 
Baxter, M., Stockman, A. C., 1989. Business cycles and the exchange-rate regime: Some 
international evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (3), 377–400. 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., Maksimovic, V., 2006. The determinants of 
financing obstacles. Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (6), 932-952. 
Beck, T., Lundberg, M., Majnoni, G., 2006. Financial intermediary development and 
growth volatility: Do intermediaries dampen or magnify shocks. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 25 (7), 1146-1167. 
Beck, T., Degryse, H., Kneer, C., 2014. Is more finance better? Disentangling 
inter-mediation and size effects of financial systems. Journal of Financial Stability 
10 (1), 50-64. 
Bejan M., 2006. Trade openness and output volatility. MPRA paper 2759. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C., 2006. Growth volatility and financial liberalization. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (3), 370–403. 
Berger, A., Udell, G., 1998. The economics of small business finance: The roles of private 
equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance 
22 (6-8), 613–673. 
  134 
Bernanke, B., 1983. Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the 
Great Depression. American Economic Review 73 (3), 257-276. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1989. Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations. 
American Economic Review 79 (1), 14-31. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1990. Financial fragility and economic performance. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (1), 87-114. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1995. Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4), 27–48. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1996. The financial accelerator and the flight to 
quality. Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (1), 1–15. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1999. The financial accelerator in a quantitative 
business cycle framework. Chapter 21 in Handbook of Macroeconomics 1 (C), 
1341-1393. 
Bertay, A. C. Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Huizinga, H., 2015. Bank ownership and credit over the 
business cycle: Is lending by state banks less procyclical? Journal of Banking & 
Finance 50 (C), 326-339. 
Bikker, J., Metzemakers, P., 2005. Bank provisioning behavior and procyclicality. Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 15 (2), 141–157. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models. Journal of Econometrics 87 (1), 115-143. 
Bodman, P.M., 2001. Steepness and deepness in the Australian macroeconomy. Applied 
Economics 33 (3), 375–382. 
Braun, M., Larrain, B., 2005. Finance and the business cycle: International, inter-industry 
evidence. Journal of Finance 60 (3), 1097-1128. 
Caballero, R., Krishnamurthy, A., 2001. International and domestic collateral constraints 
in a model of emerging market crises. Journal of Monetary Economics 48 (3), 
513-548. 
  135 
Caballero, R., Simsek, A., 2013. Fire sales in a model of complexity. Journal of Finance 
68 (6), 2549–2587. 
Caldara, D., Fuentes-Albero, C., Gilchrist, S., Zakrajsek, E., 2016. The macroeconomic 
impact of financial and uncertainty shocks. European Economic Review 88 (C), 
185-207. 
Calderón, C., Schmidt-Hebbel, K., 2008. Openness and growth volatility. Working paper 
No. 483, Central Bank of Chile. 
Calderón, C., Fuentes, J. R., 2014. Have business cycles changed over the last two 
decades? An empirical investigation. Journal of Development Economics 109 (C), 
98–123. 
Campello, M., Graham, J., Harvey, C., 2010. The real effects of financial constraints: 
Evidence from a financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3), 470–487.  
Caner, M., Hansen, B., 2004. Instrumental variable estimation of a threshold model. 
Econometric Theory 20 (5), 813–843. 
Cecchetti, S. G., Krause, S., 2001. Financial structure, macroeconomic stability and 
monetary policy. NBER working paper, No. 8354. 
Chan, K., Dang, V., Yan, I., 2012. Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and 
financing constraints. Economics Letters 115 (2), 164–167. 
Chang, P., Jia, C., Wang, Z., 2010. Bank fund reallocation and economic growth: 
Evidence from China. Journal of Banking & Finance 34 (11), 2753–2766. 
Chen, G., Firth, M., Xu, L., 2009. Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence 
from China’s listed companies. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (1), 171–181. 
Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S., Wu, D., 2011. Government intervention and investment 
efficiency: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2), 259–271. 
Chen, Y., Liu, M., Su, J., 2013. Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from 
private firms in China. Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (7), 2533–2545. 
Chernozhukov, V., Fernandez-Val, I., Hahn, J., Newey, W., 2013. Average and quantile 
effects in nonseparable panel models. Econometrica 81 (2), 535–580. 
  136 
Chinn, M. D., Ito, H., 2006. What matters for financial development? Capital controls, 
institutions, and interactions. Journal of Development Economics 81 (1), 163-192. 
Chodorow-Reich, G., 2014. The employment effects of credit market disruptions: 
Firm-level evidence from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 129 (1), 1-59. 
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L., 2008. Political connections and preferential access to 
finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3), 
554–580. 
Claessens, S., Kose, M. A., Terrones, M.E., 2009. What happens during recessions, 
crunches and busts? Economic Policy 24 (60), 653–700. 
Claessens. S., Kose, M., Terrones, M., 2012. How do business and financial cycles 
interact. Journal of International Economics 87 (1), 178–90. 
Corsetti, G., Meier, A., Muller, G., 2012. What determines government spending 
multipliers? Economic Policy 27 (72), 521–565. 
Cull, R., Xu, L., 2003, Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in 
allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises. Journal of Development 
Economics 71 (2), 533– 559. 
Dabla-Norris, E., Srivisal, N., 2013. Revisiting the link between finance and 
macroeconomic volatility. IMF Working Paper 13/29. 
Dell’ Ariccia, G., Detragiache, E., Rajan, R., 2008. The real effect of banking crisis. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 17 (1), 89–112. 
Denizer, C., Iyigun, M., Owen, A., 2002. Finance and macroeconomic volatility. 
Contributions to Macroeconomics 2 (1), Article 7. 
Di Giovanni, J., Levchenko, A. A., 2009. Trade openness and volatility. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 91 (3), 558–585. 
Diamond, D., Rajan, R., 2011. Fear of fire sales, illiquidity seeking and the credit freeze. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2), 557-591. 
Drakos, K., Giannakopoulos, N., 2011. On the determinants of credit rationing: Firm-level 
  137 
evidence from transition countries. Journal of International Money and Finance 30 
(8), 1773–1790. 
Duarte, M., Restuccia, D., Waddle, A. L., 2007. Exchange rates and business cycles across 
countries. Economic Quarterly 93 (1), 57–76. 
Dynan, K. E., Elmendorf, D. W., Sichel, D. E., 2006. Can financial innovation help to 
explain the reduced volatility of economic activity. Journal of Monetary Economics 53 
(1), 123–150. 
Easterly, W., Islam, R., Stiglitz, J., 2001. Shaken and stirred: Explaining growth 
volatility. In: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 191-211. 
Egert, B., Sutherland, D., 2014. The nature of financial and real business cycle: The great 
moderation and banking sector pro-cyclicality. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
61 (1), 98–117. 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R., McConnell, J., 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. 
Journal of Finance 61 (6), 2597–2635. 
Faccio, M., 2010. Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A 
cross-country analysis. Financial Management 39 (3), 905–928. 
Faia, E., 2007. Financial differences and business cycle co-movements in a currency area. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39 (1), 151-185. 
Fama, E., French, K., 1998. Taxes, financing decisions, and firm value. Journal of Finance 
53 (3), 819–843. 
Fernández, A., González, F., Suárez, N., 2016. Banking stability, competition, and 
economic volatility. Journal of Financial Stability 22 (C), 101–120. 
Ferrante, F., 2015. A model of endogenous loan quality and the collapse of the shadow 
banking system, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-021. Washington: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Ferreira da Silva, G., 2002. The impact of financial system development on business 
cycles volatility: Cross-country evidence. Journal of Macroeconomics 24 (2), 
233-253. 
  138 
Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P., Wong, S., 2009. Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in 
China’s private sector. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (6), 1144–1155. 
Jefferson, G., 2016. State-owned enterprise in China: Reform, performance, and 
prospects. No. 109, Working Papers from Brandeis University, Department of 
Economics and International Business School.  
Gali, J., Perotti, R., 2003. Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe. Economic 
Policy 18 (37), 533–572. 
Galindo, A., Schiantarelli, F., 2003. Credit constraints and investment in Latin America. 
Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. 
Galvao Jr., A. F., 2011. Quantile regression for dynamic panel data with fixed effects. 
Journal of Econometrics 164 (1), 142–157. 
Garcia, R., Schaller, H., 2002. Are the effects of monetary policy asymmetric? Economic 
Inquiry 40 (1), 102–119. 
Garmaise, M., 2008. Production in entrepreneurial firms: The effects of financial 
constraints on labor and capital. Review of Financial Studies 21(2), 543–577. 
Greenwood, J., Jovanovic, B., 1990. Financial development, growth, and the distribution 
of income. Journal of Political Economy 98 (5), 1076-1107. 
Gertler, M., Karadi, P., 2011. A model of unconventional monetary policy. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 58 (1), 17-34. 
Gurley, J. G., Shaw, E. S., 1955. Financial aspects of economic development. American 
Economic Review 45 (4), 515-538. 
Hadlock, C., Pierce, J., 2010. New evidence on measuring financial constraints: Moving 
beyond the KZ Index. Review of Financial Studies 23 (5), 1909–1940. 
Halvorsen, J., Jacobsen, D., 2014. How important can bank lending shocks be for 
economic fluctuations. North American Journal of Economics and Finance 29 (C), 
104–123. 
Hansen, B., 1999. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation, testing, and 
inference. Journal of Econometrics 93 (2), 345–368. 
  139 
Hansen, B., 2000. Sample splitting and threshold estimation. Econometrica 68 (3), 
575–603. 
Hasan, F., Koetter, M., Wedow, M., 2009. Regional growth and finance in Europe: Is there 
a quality effect of bank efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (8), 1446–1453. 
Huang, Y., 2008. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: State and entrepreneurship 
during reform. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Huynh, K., Petrunia, R., 2010. Age effects, leverage and firm growth. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (5), 1003-1013. 
Ibrahim, M., 2016. Business cycle and bank lending procyclicality in a dual banking 
system. Economic Modelling 55 (C), 127–134. 
Ibrahim, M., Alagidede, P., 2017. Financial sector development, economic volatility and 
shocks in sub-Saharan Africa. Physica A 484 (C), 66–81. 
Jappelli, T., Pistaferri, L., 2011. Financial integration and consumption smoothing. 
Economic Journal 121 (553), 678-706. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs of 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4), 305-360. 
Jin, J., Kanagaretnam, K., Lobob, G., 2011. Ability of accounting and audit quality 
variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 35 (11), 2811–2819. 
Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., Taylor, A., 2013. When credit bites back. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 45 (s2), 3–28. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., 2002. Does mortality decline promote economic growth? Journal of 
Economic Growth 7 (4), 411–439. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., 2003. A stochastic model of mortality, fertility, and human capital 
investment. Journal of Development Economics 70 (1), 103–118. 
Kaplan, S., Zingales, L., 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints? Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2), 707–12. 
  140 
Kashyap, A., Stein, J., 2004. Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards. 
Economic Perspectives 28 (1), 18-31. 
Kato, K., Galvao, A. F., Montes-Rojas, G. V., 2012. Asymptotics for panel quantile 
regression models with individual effects. Journal of Econometrics 170 (1), 76-91. 
Keynes, J. M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. 
MacMillan, London. 
Kiani, K. M., Bidarkota, P. V., 2004. On business cycle asymmetries in G7 countries. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66 (3), 333-351. 
Kilian, L., Vigfusson, R. J., 2011a. Are the responses of the U.S. economy asymmetric in 
energy price increases and decreases? Quantitative Economics 2 (3), 419-453. 
Kilian, L., Vigfusson, R. J., 2011b. Nonlinearities in the oil price-output relationship. 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 15 (S3), 337-363. 
King, R., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108 (3), 717-737. 
Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105 (2) 
211-248. 
Kletzer, K., Bardhan, P., 1987. Credit markets and patterns of international trade. Journal 
of Development Economics 27 (1-2), 57-70. 
Koenker, R., Bassett, G. W., 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46 (1), 33–49. 
Koenker, R., 2004. Quantile regression for longitudinal data. Journal of Multivariate 
Analysis 91 (1), 74–89. 
Koetter, M., Wedow, M., 2010. Finance and growth in a bank-based economy: Is it 
quantity or quality that matters. Journal of International Money and Finance 29 (8), 
1529-1545. 
Kose, A., Prasad, E., Terrones, M., 2003. Financial integration and macroeconomic 
volatility. IMF Staff Papers 50, 119–141. 
Kose, M. A., Yi, K. M., 2006. Can the standard international business cycle model explain 
  141 
the relation between trade and comovement? Journal of International Economics 68 
(2), 267–295. 
Kose, M. A., Otrok, C., Prasad, E., 2008. Global business cycles: Convergence or 
decoupling? Working Papers No. 14292. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Kremer, S., Bick, A., Nautz, D., 2013. Inflation and growth: New evidence from a 
dynamic panel threshold analysis. Empirical Economics 44 (2), 861–878. 
Kunieda, T., 2008. Financial development and volatility of growth rates: New evidence. 
Ryukoku University, mimeo. 
Lamarche, C., 2010. Robust penalized quantile regression estimation for panel data. 
Journal of Econometrics 157 (2), 396–408. 
Lane, P., 2003. The cyclicality of fiscal policy: Evidence from the OECD. Journal of 
Public Economics 87 (12), 2661–2675. 
Lang, L., Ofek, E., Stulz, R., 1996. Leverage, investment, and firm growth. Journal of 
Financial Economics 40 (1), 3-29. 
Levine, R., 1997. Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature 35 (2), 688-726. 
Levine, R., Loayza, N., Beck, T., 2000. Financial intermediation and growth: Causality 
and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (1), 31–77. 
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Xuan, Y., 2011. Ownership structure and financial constraints: Evidence 
from a structural estimation. Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2), 416–431. 
Liu, Q., Pan, X., Tian, G., 2018. To what extent did the economic stimulus package 
influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions? Evidence from China, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 68, 177-193. 
Lo, M. C., Piger, J., 2005. Is the response of output to monetary policy asymmetric? 
Evidence from a regime-switching coefficients model. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 37 (5), 865-886. 
Love, I., 2003. Financial development and financing constraints: International evidence 
  142 
from the structural investment model. Review of Financial Studies 16 (3), 765–791. 
Love, I., Zicchino, L., 2006. Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: 
Evidence from panel VAR. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46 (2), 
190–210.  
Lowe, P., Segoviano, M., 2002. Internal ratings, the business cycle and capital 
requirements: Some evidence from an emerging market economy. BIS Working Paper 
117. 
Ma, Y., Zhang J., 2016. Financial cycle, business cycle and monetary policy: Evidence 
from four major economies. International Journal of Finance & Economics 21 (4), 
502–527. 
Magud, N. E., 2008. On asymmetric business cycles and the effectiveness of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Journal of Macroeconomics 30 (3), 885–905. 
Mandelman, F., 2010. Business cycles and monetary regimes in emerging economies: A 
role for a monopolistic banking sector. Journal of International Economics 81 (1), 
122–138. 
Mangelli, S., Popov, A., 2015. Financial development, sectoral reallocation, and 
volatility: International evidence. Journal of International Economics 96 (2), 
323-337. 
McConnell, J., Servaes, H., 1995. Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of 
Financial Economics 39 (1), 131-157. 
Mimir, Y., 2016. Financial intermediaries, credit shocks and business cycles. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 78 (1), 42–74. 
Mitchell, W., 1927. Business cycles: The problem and its setting. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, New York. 
Modigliani, F., Miller, M., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of 
investment. American Economic Review 48 (3), 261–97. 
Mohaddes, K., Pesaran, M. H., 2016. Country-specific oil supply shocks and the global 
economy: a counterfactual analysis. Energy Economics 59 (C), 382–399. 
  143 
Mohaddes, K., Pesaran, M. H., 2017. Oil prices and the global economy: Is it different this 
time around? Energy Economics 65, 315–325. 
Myers, S., Majluf, N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decision when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2), 
187-221. 
Narayan, P. K., Narayan, S., 2008. Examining the asymmetric behavior of 
macroeconomic aggregates in Asian economies. Pacific Economic Review 13 (5), 
567–574. 
Narayan, P .K., 2009. Are health expenditures and GDP characterized by asymmetric 
behavior? Evidence from 11 OECD countries. Applied Economics 41 (4), 531–536. 
Nolan, C., Thoenissen, C., 2009. Financial shocks and the US business cycle. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 56 (4), 596–604. 
Obstfeld, M., 1994. Risk-taking, global diversification, and growth. American Economic 
Review 84 (5), 1310-1329. 
Ouyang, M., Peng, Y., 2015. The treatment-effect estimation: A case study of the 2008 
economic stimulus package of China. Journal of Econometrics 188 (2), 545–557. 
Pagano, M., 1993. Financial markets and growth: An overview. European Economic 
Review 37 (2-3), 613-622. 
Pagano, M., Pica, G., 2012. Finance and employment. Economic Policy 27 (69), 5–55. 
Pederzoli, C., Torricelli, C., 2005. Capital requirements and business cycle regimes: 
Forward-looking modeling of default probabilities. Journal of Banking & Finance 29 
(12), 3121–3140. 
Poncet, S., Steingress, W., Vandenbussche, H., 2010. Financial constraints in China: 
Firm-level evidence. China Economic Review 21 (3), 411–422. 
Powell, D., 2016a. Quantile regression with nonadditive fixed effects. RAND Labor and 
Population Working Paper. 
Powell, D., 2016b. Quantile treatment effects in the presence of covariates. RAND Labor 
and Population Working Paper. 
  144 
Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic 
Review 88 (3), 559-586. 
Ramsey, J. B., Rothman, P., 1996. Time irreversibility and business cycle asymmetry. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28 (1), 1-21. 
Ramey, G., Ramey, V., 1995. Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and 
growth. American Economic Review 85 (5), 1138-1151. 
Roodman, D., 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 71 (1), 135–158. 
Rosen, A. M., 2012. Set identification via quantile restrictions in short panels. Journal of 
Econometrics 166 (1), 127-137. 
Santoro, E., Petrella, I., Pfajfar, D., Gaffeo, E., 2014. Loss aversion and the asymmetric 
transmission of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 68 (C), 19-36. 
Schiffer, M., Weder, B., 2001. Firm size and the business environment: Worldwide survey 
results. Discussion Paper No. 43, International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC. 
Schumpeter, J., 1912. The theory of economic development. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Schumpeter, J., 1934. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, 
capital, credits, interest, and the business cycle. Transaction Publishers, Piscataway. 
Sichel, D., 1993. Business cycle asymmetry: A deeper look. Economic Inquiry 31 (2), 
224-236. 
Tang, S., Groenewold, N., Leung, C., 2008. The link between institutions, technical 
change and macroeconomic volatility. Journal of Macroeconomics 30 (4), 1520–1549. 
Wang, J., 2014. Corporate investments in Asian markets: Financial conditions, financial 
development, and financial constraints. World Development 57, 63–78. 
Wang, P., Wen, Y., Xu, Z., 2016. Financial development and long-run volatility trends. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, working paper series. 
Wen, Y., Wu, J., 2014. Withstanding great recession like China. Working Paper 
  145 
2014-007A. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
Whited, T., Wu, G., 2006. Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies 19 (2), 
531–59. 
World Economic Outlook, 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/ 
World Economic Outlook, 2014. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/ 
Wurgler, J., 2000. Financial markets and the allocation of capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics 58 (1-2), 187-214. 
Zhang, J., Wang, L., Wang, S., 2012. Financial development and economic growth: 
Recent evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics 40 (3), 393–412. 
  146 
VITA 
WENJUN XUE 
2010 B.S., Finance 
 Shanghai University 
  
2013 M.S., Econometrics 
 Shanghai University 
  
2015 M.A., Economics 
 Central Michigan University 
  
2018 Ph.D. candidate, Economics 
 Florida International University 
  
2015-2018 Graduate Teaching Assistant 
 Florida International University 
  
 
